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ABSTRACT 
This study examines whether five methodologies—balanced scorecard, 
earned value management, integrated risk management, knowledge value added, 
and lean six sigma—can support information system (IS) acquisition within 
the Defense Acquisition System. Each of these five methodologies offers a unique 
perspective to program managers that could increase their capability to monitor, 
predict, and adjust programs during the acquisition of IS and information technology 
intensive systems. The additional information gained from the methodologies could 
allow program managers to reduce cost and schedule overruns through greater 
insight into the program’s performance. The research reviews the acquisition 
lifecycle and provides a detailed review of each approach to determine if the 
methodology could benefit program managers when acquiring ISs. In addition to 
the analysis of each technique within the context of the acquisition lifecycle, the 
research examines cases of the methodologies from an IS perspective. Using the cases 
as a guide, the thesis examines the benefits and challenges associated with each 
methodology. The research provides recommendations on which of the methodologies 
should be included and at which point in the acquisition lifecycle the methodologies 
should be used. 
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Information systems (ISs) are a vital component of most major acquisitions the 
Department of Defense (DoD) makes in the modern operating environment. Everything 
from the airplanes flying overhead to the control systems used to fire artillery and the radios 
forward observers communicate with these systems rely heavily on IS for accurate and 
timely information. The advancement of technology promises future systems will remain 
equally or become more heavily dependent on IS intensive components to give warfighters 
a competitive advantage over their adversaries.  
Unfortunately, the acquisition of IS has been fraught with problems including 
schedule and cost overruns. The pace of change of ISs is often faster than the required 
timeline to complete adequate testing, especially when problems with the program are 
discovered during development (Under Secretary of Defense, 2016). When developing 
new projects, contract requirements do not always meet the intended combat environment 
necessities, particularly when IT systems are involved (Under Secretary of Defense, 2016). 
This could be because the current methods of evaluating acquisition project performance 
do not adequately incorporate the risks inherent in IS development (Jones & Housel, 2018).  
Possibly due to these reasons, DoD IS Acquisition Category (ACAT) 1 programs 
often run over budget and longer than the scheduled time. IT programs are often the most 
volatile and the return on investment (ROI) is difficult to predict. Despite the Earned Value 
Management (EVM) reporting requirements and oversight on these programs, costs are 
often incurred beyond the original plan and project completion rarely meets the initial 
projected date. In 1993, the average cost overrun on a DoD acquisition contract is forty 
percent (Christensen, 1994). According to Edwards and Kaeding (2015), “for 78 major 
programs examined in 2014, R&D costs were 53 percent over budget, and procurement 
costs were 46 percent over budget,” ( p. 3) showing a lack of significant improvement over 
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the past two decades. The late delivery of promised IT acquisitions prevents the timely 
fielding of needed equipment to the operational forces (Under Secretary of Defense, 2016).  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The problem is the current process management and control tools program 
managers (PMs) use to support IS acquisitions do not provide adequate warning or 
sufficient information into the root causes of fiscal overruns and delays. This is a problem 
because PMs are unable to respond to issues in a timely manner, delaying the delivery of 
promised capabilities to the services. Additionally, the money and resources spent in excess 
of the original budget could be used in other acquisition programs. To better understand 
the possible causes and solutions to the problem, a study examining the strengths and 
weaknesses of five performance and project management methodologies is needed. These 
methodologies—EVM, Knowledge Value Added (KVA), Lean Six Sigma (LSS), 
Balanced Scorecard (BSC), and Integrated Risk Management (IRM)—are used to plan, 
measure, monitor, and forecast the value and progress of IS acquisitions. A thorough 
review of these project analysis and control methodologies will offer insights into the 
strengths and weaknesses each approach could offer acquisition professionals within the 
general phases of the Defense Acquisition System. This study could offer potential 
solutions to improve early warnings of cost and schedule overruns and value opportunities 
foregone in the acquisition process. This research will conduct a review of methodologies 
and their application to the acquisition process.  
B. PURPOSE STATEMENT 
The purpose of this research is to examine the potential impact of incorporating 
aspects of the five project analysis processes into the Defense Acquisition System. This is 
important because it has the potential to improve a PM’s ability to make accurate and 
timely decisions for IS acquisitions. This study will review the strengths and weaknesses 
of the five methodologies in the context of the overall IS acquisition cycle. The research 
will provide a rationale for how these methodologies, or parts of the methodologies, should 
be incorporated in the Defense Acquisition System and beyond. Research was conducted 
with acquisition subject matter experts from Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research will answer the following questions: 
• Should the methodologies be used in the acquisition lifecycle to ensure 
successful acquisition of IS technologies? 
• How should the methodologies be used in the acquisition lifecycle to 
ensure successful acquisition of IS technologies? 
• What are the risks and limitations of using each of the methodologies for 
IS acquisition? 
D. METHOD 
The research is a historical study within the context of a pragmatic epistemology. 
The research will rely on peer-reviewed studies, published literature, and case studies of 
the methodologies within an IS context. The desired result of the study is to determine 
whether any of the project management and control tools would improve the performance 
of IS acquisition in the Defense Acquisition System.  
The first step in the research is to conduct a thorough literature review of the topics 
in question. The study must identify problem areas for acquisition of IS within the Defense 
Acquisition System. Then, it must define and describe each of the five methodologies, 
noting their strengths and weaknesses and their applicability to DoD IS acquisitions. To 
assist in this endeavor, the study will examine IS acquisition cases where the 
methodologies might have been applied. Finally, the research will determine how the 
methodologies could be incorporated in the Defense Acquisition System within each phase 
of the acquisition lifecycle. 
E. SCOPE 
This study will examine the application of five methodologies within the Defense 
Acquisition System lifecycle. To limit the scope of the research, other components of the 
Defense Acquisition Decision Support System— specifically the Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System (JCIDS) and the Planning, Programming, and 
4 
Budgeting Execution (PPBE) components— are not covered within the context of the 
research. Additionally, while there are numerous other methodologies that may offer 
improvement in some areas of the acquisition lifecycle, only EVM, KVA, LSS, BSC, and 
IRM are considered for inclusion in this study as they are the most frequently used in IS 
investment decision making.  
F. THESIS STRUCTURE 
1. Introduction 
This chapter details the research problem, purpose of the study, research questions, 
scope of the research and a general outline of the thesis. 
2. Literature Review 
Chapter II covers the Defense Acquisition System, containing an explanation of the 
phases, processes, and significant events within the acquisition lifecycle. It also discusses 
the key concepts of the five methodologies considered in the study. 
3. Case Vignettes 
This chapter reviews four different cases from a perspective of the different 
methodologies. Each vignette examines a government or hypothetical commercial 
example. EVM, BSC, and LSS cases are examined individually while KVA and IRM are 
combined studies. 
4. Benefits and Challenges 
This chapter covers the benefits and challenges of the five methodologies. It also 
compares the methodologies and examines their applicability within IS acquisitions. 
5. Conclusion 
The conclusion makes recommendations regarding which methodologies should be 
included within the Defense Acquisition System and at what phases in the acquisition 
lifecycle. It also proposes area for future research in related fields. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Parts of this chapter were previously published by the Naval Postgraduate School 
Acquisition Research Program (Housel, Mun, Jones, & Carlton, 2019). 
 
This chapter discusses the Defense Acquisition System and the five methodologies 
considered for inclusion in support of the acquisition process. The descriptions of each 
methodology provide a basic understanding for the purpose of suggesting how the method 
can be applied to the acquisition process. This review provides a base level of 
understanding for how these methods can be used in development of subsequent case 
studies and for future analysis of potential improvements using these methods to the 
Defense Acquisition System. 
A. DEFENSE ACQUISITION SYSTEM 
The DoD manages the acquisition of new systems through the Defense Acquisition 
System, which manages national investment in technologies, programs, and product 
support for the United States Armed Forces (Department of Defense [DoD], 2003). Its 
primary objective is “to acquire quality products that satisfy user needs with measurable 
improvements to mission capability and operational support, in a timely manner, and at a 
fair and reasonable price” (DoD, 2003, p. 3). Within the DoD Decision Support System 
there are three separate but interrelated processes, JCIDS, PPBE, and the Defense 
Acquisition System (DoD, 2017b). This research focuses on program management, versus 
contract management, within the Defense Acquisition System. 
Acquisition programs are divided into different ACATs based on the type of 
program and the dollar amount spent, or is projected to be spent within the program (DoD, 
2015a). Figure 1 shows the various cost-based designations and categories within the 
Defense Acquisition System. All dollar amounts for ACAT classification are calculated in 
fiscal year 2014 dollars (DoD, 2015a). ACAT1 designates major defense acquisition 
programs with an estimated research, development, and test and evaluation expenditure 
(RDT&E) of more than $480 million or more than $2.79 billion for the total procurement 
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(DoD, 2015a). An ACAT1A designation is for major automated information systems that 
will exceed $520 million in total lifecycle cost, $165 million in the total program cost, or 
$40 million for any single year of a program (DoD, 2015a). ACATII programs do not meet 
the criteria for ACAT1 and will spend more than $835 million in the total procurement 
(DoD, 2015a) or more than $185 million in RDT&E. Finally, ACATIII programs are those 
that do not meet the criteria for ACATI or ACATII designation (DoD, 2015a). The 
designations allow for decentralized control of a program, as each category has different 
reporting requirements and designated decision makers (DoD, 2017b).  
 
Figure 1. Acquisition Categories. Source: DoD (2017b). 
There are five phases within the Defense Acquisition System: 
1. Materiel Solution Analysis (MSA)  
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2. Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction (TMRR) 
3. Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD)  
4. Production and Deployment (PD)  
5. Operations and Support (OS) phase.  
Requirements for new or improved capabilities, delivered through JCIDS, drive the 
acquisition process (DoD, 2015a). Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the 
acquisition and capabilities requirement processes and their interaction in the various 
acquisition phases. This study assumes the capabilities requested from the JCIDS process 
are accurate and necessary. 
 
Figure 2. Interaction of Capabilities Requirement Process and Acquisition 
Process. Source: DoD (2015a). 
Once an Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) has been validated, the Materiel 
Development Decision initiates the MSA phase (DoD, 2015a). This decision begins the 
acquisition process, although an acquisition program is not officially created until 
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milestone B at the completion of the phase (DoD, 2015a). The purpose of the MSA phase 
is to choose the most promising potential solution for the acquisition process that will fill 
the needs of the ICD and to establish Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) and Key System 
Attributes (KSAs) for the system (DoD, 2015a). To accomplish this, an Analysis of 
Alternatives (AoA) is conducted to determine the suitability of potential acquisitions based 
on “measures of effectiveness; key trades between cost and capability; total life-cycle cost, 
including sustainment; schedule; concept of operations; and overall risk” (DoD, 2015a, p. 
17). The PM is selected and the Program Office established during this time (DoD, 2015a). 
Once the necessary analysis is concluded, the decision authority—usually the Defense 
Acquisition Executive, head of the DoD component, or Component Acquisition Executive 
unless otherwise delegated—determines if the program will continue to the next phase 
based on the justification for the chosen solution, how affordable and feasible the solution 
is, how adequate the cost, schedule, and technical risk mitigation plan is, and how effective 
the acquisition strategy will be (DoD, 2015a). This decision is known as Milestone A 
(DoD, 2015a). The MSA phase takes a broad look at the potential solutions to a stated need 
and as such, may be an appropriate place to consider strategic methodologies like BSC, 
KVA, or IRM. 
After approval at Milestone A, the program enters the TMRR phase to reduce the 
risk associated with the technology, engineering, life-cycle cost, and integration of the 
program to begin the EMD phase (DoD, 2015a). Design and requirement trades occur at 
this point that are based on the budget, schedule, and likelihood of completion (DoD, 
2015a). As the requirements mature, resulting in a finalized Capabilities Development 
Document (CDD) from JCIDS prior to the next milestone (DoD, 2015a). Guided by the 
acquisition strategy approved at Milestone A, contractors develop preliminary designs—
including competitive prototypes if feasible within the program—to demonstrate the 
feasibility of their proposed solutions to the Program Office (DoD, 2015a).  
Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) serve as benchmarks that indicate the level 
of risk associated with a solution reaching maturation per the schedule (DoD, 2015a). 
Technology Readiness Assessments (TRAs) are systemic, metric-based method to evaluate 
the maturity and risk associated with the critical technology in an acquisition program 
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(DoD, 2011). A TRA will assign a TRL for each critical technology in a program, ranging 
from 1 to 9 from the lowest to highest readiness level (DoD, 2011). Additional methods, 
to assess the likelihood a program will remain on schedule and on budget may be beneficial 
at this stage, such as IRM. The Development Request for Proposals (RFP) Release 
Decision Point authorizes the release of a RFP with firm and clearly stated program 
requirements for contractors to submit their bids (DoD, 2015a). The Preliminary Design 
Review occurs prior to the completion of the TMRR phase unless waived by the milestone 
decision authority (DoD, 2015a). Milestone B approves a program to enter the EMD phase 
and awards a contract while establishing the Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) (DoD, 
2015a). The APB describes the approved program, specifically the cost and schedule for 
the life of the program and is a formal commitment to the milestone decision authority 
(DoD, 2015a).  
EMD begins once Milestone B is approved. During EMD, the materiel solution is 
developed, built, and tested to verify all requirements have been met prior to production 
(DoD, 2015a). Hardware and software designs are completed and prototypes are built to 
identify any deficiencies in the design, which will be discovered during developmental and 
operational testing (DoD, 2015a). DoD acquisitions programs with a contract value greater 
than $20 million are required by federal regulation to use EVM to track and report the 
progress of the program, which begins during this phase (DoD, 2019). Once a stable design 
that meets the specified requirements has been verified, the manufacturing or software 
sustainment processes and production capability must be properly demonstrated (DoD, 
2015a). Milestone C confirms these requirements are satisfied and approves entry into the 
PD phase (DoD, 2015a). 
The objective of the PD phase is to deliver a product that fulfills the requirements 
specified in the earlier stages (DoD, 2015a). Initial operational deployment and testing 
occurs with Low Rate Initial Production for manufactured systems or limited deployment 
for more software intensive programs where the system undergoes Operational Testing and 
Evaluation to verify stated requirements were met (DoD, 2015a). Once satisfied with the 
fielded systems, full rate production begins and the product is deployed to operational units 
(DoD, 2015a). Design changes are limited at this point, although some changes may still 
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occur based on noted deficiencies (Housel, Mun, Carlton, & Jones, 2019). Contracts 
typically revert to a fixed price strategy during this phase, reducing PM’s focus on cost and 
schedule variance (Housel et al., 2019). 
OS is designed to maintain support for the product and sustain its performance 
throughout its lifecycle, ending with the disposal of the system (DoD, 2015a). OS overlaps 
with the PD phase since operational units are using the product while production continues, 
beginning after the production or deployment decision (DoD, 2015a). PMs will sustain the 
system using the Life Cycle Sustainment Plan (LCSP) developed during the acquisition 
process, providing the necessary resources and support to keep the system operational 
(DoD, 2015a). Sustainment and support may include technological upgrades, changes due 
to operational needs, process improvements, and other activities that may require updates 
to the LCSP (DoD, 2015a). Due to the long term, relatively stable nature of the OS phase, 
LSS may be a useful methodology to reduce lifecycle cost. Once the system has completed 
its useful life, the PM oversees the demilitarization and disposal of the product (DoD, 
2015a). 
There are six different models, four standard and two hybrid, on which PMs create 
their program structure, depending on the type of system being acquired (DoD, 2015a). 
These standard models are templates for hardware-intensive programs, software-intensive 
programs that are defense unique, incrementally deployed software-intensive programs, 
and accelerated-acquisition programs (DoD, 2015a). As shown in Figure 3, the hybrid 
models mix the incremental nature of software development within a hardware centric 
program. In this model, software development is organized via a series of testable software 
builds that will culminate with the fully required capability before reaching the Initial 
Operating Capability (DoD, 2015a). The incremental builds are synchronized with 
hardware testing requirements for prototypes and other developmental requirements (DoD, 
2015a). Other models, with the exception of the accelerated program, use the same basic 
framework within the five phases. 
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Figure 3. Hardware Dominant Hybrid Program. Source: DoD (2015a). 
IS and IT systems are increasingly prevalent throughout the DoD along with their 
connection to weapon systems, facilities, and Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) (DoD, 2015b). With 
the integration, comes an increased security risk from adversaries, elevating the importance 
of effective cybersecurity capabilities and practices (DoD, 2015b). The DoD manages 
cybersecurity policy through the Risk Management Framework (RMF) by applying 
security controls founded on risk assessments throughout the lifecycle of a system (DoD, 
2015b). RMF applies to “all DoD IT that receive, process, store, display, or transmit DoD 
information” (DoD, 2014, p. 2). Cybersecurity within RMF is more than simply 
information security, including items such as stable and secure engineering designs, 
training and awareness for all users, maintainers, and operators of a program, and the 
response, recovery, and restoration of a system following an internal or external failure or 
attack (DoD, 2015b). Figure 4 illustrates the six steps within the RMF. The RMF occurs 
throughout the acquisition process. 
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Figure 4. Risk Management Framework Process. Source: DoD (2014). 
The first step is categorizing the system, during which the potential impact of a 
breach is analyzed and the system and its boundaries are described (DoD, 2014). The 
security plan is initiated, the system is registered with the DoD Component Cybersecurity 
Program, and the RMF team is formed (DoD, 2014). Cybersecurity requirements are 
included in the ICD, driving considerations in the MSA phase during the AoA (DoD, 
2015b). The risk assessment considers the potential impacts on missions resulting from a 
cybersecurity breach (DoD, 2015b). The RMF provides a relatively objective method to 
determine the cybersecurity risk level that establishes the initial baseline security controls 
necessary, to ensure they are included in the acquisition plan for the system (DoD, 2015b). 
In step two, the RMF team selects security controls, including those controls 
common to other DoD programs (DoD, 2014). A plan to continuously monitor the 
effectiveness of the controls is developed and documented (DoD, 2014). This plan is then 
submitted to the DoD components that review and approve the security plan (DoD, 2014). 
As the cybersecurity strategy is developed in the MSA phase, the acquisition and 
cybersecurity teams coordinate to ensure the appropriate level of security is implemented 
in the program throughout its lifecycle and in the system architecture and design (DoD, 
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2015b). The continuous monitoring strategy and security plan are also developed during 
MSA (DoD, 2015b). 
Next, the approved security controls are implemented per DoD guidelines (DoD, 
2014). The implementation must be appropriately documented in the system’s security plan 
(DoD, 2014). Cybersecurity requirements are part of the system performance requirements 
in the TMRR phase (DoD, 2015b).  
Then, the RMF team must develop, review, and approve a Security Assessment 
Plan that will allow proper assessment of the security controls (DoD, 2014). Once 
approved, the system security is assessed in accordance with DoD assessment procedures 
and the Security Assessment Plan, during which vulnerabilities are assigned severity values 
and the security risk for both the controls and the aggregate system is determined (DoD, 
2014). This is documented in the Security Assessment Report, which is required before 
authorization of any system, and remediate actions on the security controls are conducted 
(DoD, 2014). The cybersecurity requirements stated in the Capability Development 
Document is validated during the TMRR phase prior to a Request for Proposals (DoD, 
2015b). The Preliminary Design Review, which is also conducted during the TMRR phase, 
will include cybersecurity aspects, ensuring the approved plan is implemented in the 
chosen design and risks are mitigated to an appropriate level (DoD, 2015b). As the system 
develops in the EMD phase, all computer code follows applicable standards and secure 
coding practices with assessments conducted and documented in the Security Plan (DoD, 
2015b). 
Based on the recognized vulnerabilities, a Plan of Action and Milestones 
(POA&M) is created that identifies tasks needed to mitigate the vulnerabilities, resources 
necessary to complete the plan, and milestones towards completing tasks (DoD, 2014). The 
Authorizing Official receives the Security Authorization Package, who will determine if 
the risk level is appropriate prior to authorizing the system (DoD, 2014). Creation of the 
POA&M begins in the MSA phase and continues throughout system development (DoD, 
2015b).  
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Finally, the security controls must be monitored throughout the life of the system 
to ensure any changes to the system or the environment do not negatively affect 
cybersecurity measures (DoD, 2014). Should someone detect vulnerabilities, the necessary 
remediation will be conducted and the security plan updated (DoD, 2014). Once a system 
is approved and operationally deployed, the cybersecurity is monitored in accordance with 
the continuous monitoring strategy and Security Plan (DoD, 2015b). New risk assessments 
are conducted when changes to the system, its environment, or the planned use of the 
system occur (DoD, 2015b). Should vulnerabilities occur, the PM updates Security Plan 
and POA&M to indicate how the vulnerability will be addressed (DoD, 2015b). 
B. EARNED VALUE MANAGEMENT 
Currently, the DoD uses EVM within the Defense Acquisition System to evaluate 
the progress of acquisitions. EVM is a system PMs use to integrate the work scope with 
the cost and schedule of that program to improve the control and planning of the 
acquisition. It establishes a baseline for the objectives of the program to measure cost and 
schedule performance while the project is being executed. EVM is used to identify 
problems, create corrective actions to fix those problems, and allow management to re-plan 
the program as required (Electronic Industries Alliance, 1998). The Federal Acquisition 
Regulation requires DoD acquisition programs whose contract value exceed $20 million 
are required to use EVM in the program office (DoD, 2019). Mandates within the federal 
government require reports on the progress and execution of acquisition projects, leading 
to an emphasis on performance measures.  
In sum, EVM exists to provide an assessment of the actual, physical work a project 
has completed compared to a baseline plan (Fleming & Koppelman, 2010). In Earned 
Value Project Management, the authors explain that EVM integrates the actual cost spent 
on the project to date with the work that has been performed on the project, allowing 
managers to compare the progress of the project with their planned budget and schedule. It 
provides managers the ability to compare cost performance with work completion rather 
than simply cost performance and planned cost, as is done in traditional cost management 
(Fleming & Koppelman, 2010). According to Fleming and Koppelman (2010), when 
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properly employed, EVM provides a reliable prediction of the total cost and schedule 
requirements for a project through three distinct dimensions: the planned value, earned 
value, and actual cost. 
Planned value (PV), referred to within the DoD as Budgeted Cost of Work 
Scheduled (BCWS), is the amount of work, either physical or intellectual, scheduled to be 
completed by a certain point (Fleming & Koppelman, 2010). It is a time-phased budget 
reference and is used throughout the project as a baseline for the amount of work complete 
by the scheduled date (Vanhoucke, 2014). When depicted graphically (as in Figure 6), it is 
an upward-sloping function and shows the cumulative increase in all scheduled and 
budgeted activities from the beginning of the project until completion (Vanhoucke, 2014). 
Simply stated, BCWS is the authorized budget for authorized work (Fleming & 
Koppelman, 2010). This baseline should be established prior to a program’s initiation and 
should remain constant throughout the program to maintain a fixed reference, although the 
baseline can be re-established if performance is drastically different from originally 
planned to improve future project control (Vanhoucke, 2014). 
To establish a baseline, the scope of a project must be fully defined, the resources 
necessary to complete the project must be understood, and the compulsory tasks must be 
placed into the timeline required to complete each task (Fleming & Koppelman, 2010). “If 
you do not know what constitutes 100% of a project, how will you ever know if you are 
10, 20, or 35 percent done?” (Fleming & Koppelman, 2010, p. 48). Project managers create 
a work breakdown structure (WBS) to produce an accurate baseline. A WBS is a division 
of tasks arranged in a hierarchical, tiered fashion portraying the breakdown of activities 
used to authorize, track, and report a program’s progress. It relates the individual elements 
necessary to complete work to each other and the system as a whole (DoD, 2005). A WBS 
can be expressed in any level of detail, from high-level systems view, such as Figure 5, 
down to the distinct pieces of material needed to construct a component, depending on the 
level of detail needed (DoD, 2005). Within the 5000 series, the BCWS baseline is usually 
established during the TMRR phase. 
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Figure 5. Sample WBS. Source: DoD (2005). 
Earned value (EV), the second dimension within EVM, represents the amount of 
money from a project’s total budget spent on the work accomplished at a certain point in 
time (Vanhoucke, 2014). Also referred to as the Budgeted Cost of Work Performed 
(BCWP), it shows the total budget of the completed work packages and finished sections 
of open work packages (DoD, 2019). BWCP is comprised of the amount of authorized 
work that was actually completed with the amount of the original budget for accomplishing 
the given work (Fleming & Koppelman, 2010).  
The third dimension of EVM is actual cost (AC), or the Actual Cost of Work 
Performed (ACWP). ACWP is the cumulative total cost a program has spent to accomplish 
work at a given point in time (Vanhoucke, 2014). It measures the amount of money used 
to convert the planned value into earned value within the measured time frame (Fleming 
& Koppelman, 2010). ACWP depicts the amount of money spent on a project regardless 
of the output of the work. It is purely a financial metric illustrated over the elapsed time of 
a project and does not account for the amount of work actually accomplished. 
Figure 6 gives a graphical depiction of PV (BCWS), EV (BCWP), and AC (ACWP) 
for a fictitious project. In blue is the PV, showing the amount of money budgeted to 
complete specific work packages based on the WBS. Green displays the budgeted cost of 
the work packages that have been completed at a specific time, or EV. At the project’s 
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completion, EV and PV are equal since EV is calculated as a percentage of the planned 
budget. AC, shown in red, portrays the money spent to complete the EV at the same point 
in time. Ideally, all three lines will overlap, indicating the project is exactly on schedule 
and budget. However, this is rarely the case and the differences indicate the need for 
additional information to determine what corrections are necessary, leading to the 
performance metrics. 
 
Figure 6. S Curve with the Three EVM Dimensions. Source: Vanhoucke 
(2014). 
Four performance metrics within EVM provide indications of a program’s current 
performance compared to the baseline cost variance (CV), cost performance index (CPI), 
schedule variance (SV), and schedule performance index (SPI) (DoD, 2019). CV 
determines the difference between the EV work completed and the AC: CV = EV – AC 
(Fleming & Koppelman, 2010). If the difference is less than zero, the project is over budget, 
greater than zero is under budget, and if equal to zero, the project is on budget (Vanhoucke, 
2014). The CPI is the ratio of completed work to the budget, calculated by dividing EV by 
AC: CPI = EV/AC (Fleming & Koppelman, 2010). CPI can be used to forecast a range of 
total costs to finish a project based on the performance of the project to date (Fleming & 
Koppelman, 2010). If the CPI is greater than 1, the project is under budget, less than 1 is 
over budget, and if equal to 1, the project is on budget (Vanhoucke, 2014). Both CV and 
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CPI measure the deviation in the value of the completed work (EV) and the cost of the 
work (AC) (Vanhoucke, 2014). Figure 7 shows the performance metrics from the example 
project in Figure 6 with CV and CPI in red. The CPI drops to roughly 0.7 in just over a 
week before maintaining a relatively constant level, indicating the project is over budget, 
while the CV continues to become increasingly negative, showing the increasing amount 
of money spent above what was budgeted (Vanhoucke, 2014). Although the magnitude of 
the CV continued to increase, the CPI remained constant, denoting the project continued 
to earn value at 70% of the planned rate. 
 
Figure 7. Example Performance Metric Curves. Source: Vanhoucke (2014). 
Similarly, SV and SPI compare the performance of a project with respect to its 
planned schedule. In the same manner that CV and CPI examine cost, these metrics 
quantify the divergence in the value of the completed work (EV) and the amount of value 
expected at a given point in time (PV) (Vanhoucke, 2014). SV is the difference between 
the EV work completed and the PV: SV = EV – PV (Fleming & Koppelman, 2010). If the 
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difference is less than zero, the project is behind schedule, greater than zero is ahead of 
schedule, and if equal to zero, the project is on schedule (Vanhoucke, 2014). SPI is the 
ratio of completed work to the scheduled time that work was completed, calculated by 
dividing EV by PV: SPI = EV/PV (Fleming & Koppelman, 2010). This ratio can be used 
to estimate the project completion date (Fleming & Koppelman, 2010). If the SPI is greater 
than 1, the project is ahead of schedule, less than 1 is behind schedule, and if equal to 1 the 
project is on schedule (Vanhoucke, 2014). Once again, Figure 7 shows the SPI and SV for 
the previous project in blue. The SPI initially dips to roughly 0.7 before climbing back to 
1 at the end of the timeline, while SV varies in a correlated curve until increasing back to 
0 at the completion of the project (Vanhoucke, 2014). This indicates a slower start to the 
project and a recovery towards the schedule as work proceeds, even though SV never 
equals 0 and SPI never equals 1—the corresponding values for on-schedule performance—
until the conclusion. While it may not be initially evident, this tells project managers the 
program did not finish within the planned timeline. 
It is important to note the term value in EVM does not have the same meaning as 
in other methodologies, such as KVA. Within the context of EVM, value is defined as the 
work accomplished towards completion of the project. There is no reference to the quality 
of the completed work or additional (or missing) benefits the work might provide to a 
system. The value is assumed because the specifications were defined in the project 
requirements. 
EVM has proven to be a reliable system to manage cost and schedule performance 
for manufacturing in both defense and commercial industries. However, as systems become 
more complicated and information technology (IT) and IS gain a more prominent place 
within even traditional manufacturing projects, EVM may need additional information 
from additional methodologies to improve its capabilities. Better incorporating the 
strategic guidance associated with a program, the value gained from subcomponents and 
sub-processes, the risk associated with developing subcomponents of a system, and 
incrementally improving a process may help improve the Defense Acquisition System as 
a whole. 
20 
C. BALANCED SCORECARD 
BSC is a system designed by Robert Kaplan and David Norton to incorporate 
financial and non-financial measurements when assessing a company’s performance 
(Keyes, 2011). Traditional accounting metrics, such as ROI and earnings-per-share, do not 
necessarily indicate long-term improvement or innovation (Kaplan & Norton, 1992). It is 
also important to place value on the intangible assets within a company (Keyes, 2011). 
BSC is founded on the concept that “what you measure is what you get” (Kaplan & Norton, 
1992, p. 71). By developing measurements for an organization’s intangible components, 
these aspects of a business should also improve. When properly employed, BSC gives 
managers complex information about the entire system in a readily identifiable format 
(Kaplan & Norton, 1992). Effective measurement is a key component of leading an 
organization, and the BSC methodology allows managers to focus their performance 
measures towards a comprehensive strategy for both present and long-term success 
(Kaplan & Norton, 1993).  
The BSC concept is not an overly complex process. After an organization has 
determined its vision or mission, it then develops a strategy (Kaplan & Norton, 1993). The 
scorecard stems from the strategy, translating the vision into objectives and measures 
(Norreklit, 2000). Four categories—financial, customer satisfaction, internal business 
processes, learning and growth—within each scorecard correspond with separate but 
related components of a business, each of which answer a basic, but crucial, question 
(Kaplan & Norton, 1992). Figure 8 illustrates the various categories, the questions they 
address, and their interdependence. Limiting the BSC to only four categories minimizes 
information overload and concentrates efforts on specific, attainable objectives (Kaplan & 
Norton, 1992). Selecting a limited number of categories, and metrics within each category, 
focuses effort and helps define the strategic vision (Kaplan & Norton, 1993). Presenting 
the categories via the BSC assimilates seemingly contrasting components within a 
company’s agenda in a single report (Kaplan & Norton, 1992). It allows leadership to 
determine if the company achieved success in one area, for instance, financial success, at 
the expense of another area, such as learning and growth (Kaplan & Norton, 1992). 
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Figure 8. The Balanced Scorecard Framework. Source: Kaplan & Norton 
(2007). 
Within each category, leadership sets goals for the company to achieve (Kaplan & 
Norton, 1992). For each goal on the scorecard, there is a corresponding measurement 
(Kaplan & Norton, 1992). Without a measurement, there is no way to objectively determine 
the performance towards each goal. Customer concerns often relate to time, quality, service 
level or performance, and cost (Kaplan & Norton, 1992). While the measures will vary for 
each company, aspects such as lead time, customer surveys, and third-party awards could 
indicate a company’s customer performance (Kaplan & Norton 1992). Within the military, 
customer concerns- with the customer being the warfighter- are similar, relating to the 
accuracy of information and ordnance, timeliness of information and responses, overall 
performance, and cost to acquire the system. Measurements could compare the newly 
acquired system to the previous method for accomplishing tasks. 
Internal business perspective addresses what the company can do to meet the 
expectations of its customers (Kaplan & Norton, 1992). As such, metrics should deal with 
components that will affect their customers—cycle time, quality, productivity, and so on—
as well as the core competencies of the business (Kaplan & Norton, 1992). These same 
metrics also work within the DoD. The cycle time, quality, and productivity translate into 
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a quicker response on the battlefield for the warfighter or for administrative tasks when 
away from the front. Readiness is an additional metric that should be included in this 
category, indicating how prepared a unit is to complete its mission. 
Learning and growth concentrates on an organization’s ability to transfer 
knowledge and innovate (Kefe, 2019). Measurements for the learning and growth category 
could include the amount and effectiveness of training or the employee retention rate (Kefe, 
2019). The DoD can implement the same metrics within the military to analyze how 
effective it is at promoting learning and growth. When viewing all acquisition programs as 
a portfolio of projects, decision makers could determine how a potential IS or IT system 
may influence the organization’s ability to transfer knowledge. 
Financial measurements consist of a business’s profitability, growth, and creation 
of value (Kefe, 2019). These are typically measured by traditional financial metrics, such 
as profit margin or return on investment (ROI), revenue to assets ratio, and market value 
added or stock price, respectively (Kefe, 2019). Since the DoD does not generate profit, 
these metrics are not as appropriate within defense acquisitions. However, evaluating the 
value of a system compared to the cost (or cost savings) associated with the system can 
provide useful financial metrics. A method to determine this value is discussed in the KVA 
section. 
Leadership should use four management processes when implementing BSC 
(Kaplan & Norton, 2007). Figure 9 illustrates these cyclical processes. First, leadership 
should translate the vision to useful terms (Kaplan & Norton, 2007). Broad, strategic 
statements do not always transfer well to the operational level, so the strategy must be 
converted into goals and objectives (Kaplan & Norton, 2007). Next, managers must 
communicate the strategy throughout the organization and link their department’s goals 
and objectives to the overarching vision (Kaplan & Norton, 2007). This includes linking 
the rewards and performance system to BSC metrics (Kaplan & Norton, 2007). Then, the 
business plan should be adjusted as necessary to reflect the BSC, ensuring targets are 
appropriately set and a suitable amount of resources are allocated to meet the stated 
objectives (Kaplan & Norton, 2007). Finally, establishing a feedback and learning system 
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with the BSC at its center will allow managers to monitor performance, evaluate strategy, 
and adjust objectives as needed (Kaplan & Norton, 2007). 
BSC could provide valuable perspective to the DoD when determining how to fill 
a specified need. Linking the various categories to acquisition categories could help 
determine the best solution for an IS or IT need. Rather than looking at each acquisition as 
an individual system, a BSC approach could help decision-makers assess the needs of the 
organization rather than just state requirements for a single program. However, the DoD 
Decision Support System does incorporate some of these considerations already, 
specifically in the interaction between JCIDS and the Defense Acquisition System, which 
may diminish some advantages typically gained from using BSC. 
 
Figure 9. Managing Strategy. Source: Kaplan & Norton (2007). 
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D. KNOWLEDGE VALUE ADDED 
KVA is an empirical model that focuses on the practical application and 
implementation of knowledge management (Tsai, 2014). Originally developed to assist in 
business process reengineering, KVA creates an objective, quantifiable method to measure 
the value of a process or service (Housel & Kanevsky, 1995). Typical financial approaches 
to business process reengineering use the dollar amount of a final product to determine the 
value of an object, failing to account for the knowledge required in the various sub-
processes involved in making the product (Housel & Kanevsky, 1995). In its essence, KVA 
does a single function, describing all process outputs in common units. KVA accounts for 
the value of all components, processes, and support systems necessary to complete a task 
or create a product or service by describing all outputs in common units. It allows managers 
to compare the efficiency of the various steps across all processes within a common value 
reference point. 
In KVA, value has a different meaning than it does in other methodologies, such as 
EVM or LSS. Instead, KVA bases its definition of value on complexity theory and views 
organizational processes by their ability to change their input—be that raw material, 
information, energy, etc.—into a common units of output, as shown in Figure 10 (Housel 
& Kanevsky, 1995). Per Figure 10, process P changes the input in some manner, creating 
a different product or service at the output, adding value to the system based on the number 
of common unit changes from input to output (Housel & Kanevsky, 1995). If process P did 
not change input X, then output Y is the same as input X, indicating no value was added 
by the system (Housel & Kanevsky, 1995). While the change from X to Y may be minute 
or large depending on the process, KVA converts all changes into common units, and these 
changes indicate the amount of value added by process P to produce the final product. The 
value generated through the process is proportional to the change in the state from X to Y, 
denoting the amount of knowledge required to make the changes (Yu, Chang, Yao, & Liu, 
2009). Thus, the contribution to a process is equivalent to the sum of all knowledge 
necessary to produce a product and/or interpret meaning from an input (Housel & 
Kanevsky, 2006). This is true for all processes within a system, from production to service 
to management.  
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Figure 10. Value Added Process. Source: Housel & Kanevsky (1995). 
The KVA methodology is best completed by following the seven-step process 
shown in Figure 11. Housel and Bell explain in their 2001 book, Measuring and Managing 
Knowledge, practitioners can use a number of methods to describe the units of change, such 
as tasks, Haye knowledge points, Shannon bits, units of knowledge, etc. For ease of 
measurement, they continue, three measures are typically used within KVA to estimate the 
embedded knowledge within a process. According to the authors, learning time, column 
two in Figure 11, measures the length of time it takes an average user to learn a process 
and correctly complete it. Process description, column two, is the number of process 
instructions used to transform the given input into the desired output (Housel & Bell, 2001). 
Housel and Bell note that each instruction must require an approximately equal amount of 
knowledge to complete a task. The binary query method uses the number of binary 
questions (i.e., bits) necessary to accomplish the process, roughly equivalent to the lines of 
code within a computer program (Housel & Bell, 2001). However, the authors assert that 




Figure 11. The KVA Approach. Source: Housel & Bell (2001). 
The first step, regardless of which metric an analyst employs, is identifying the core 
process and its sub-processes (Housel & Bell, 2001). To fully understand and accurately 
measure the knowledge inherent in a process, the entirety of the process must be mapped 
and understood. Next, analysts determine the measure that will be used in the analysis to 
describe the sub-process outputs in common units (Housel & Bell, 2001). Learning time or 
lines of code are the commonly used units as they can be used to convert outputs into 
common units relatively quickly depending on the degree of accuracy required. Analysts 
must then calculate the number of units (i.e., learning time, tasks, or lines of code) within 
each sub-process (Housel & Bell, 2001). Then, the actual measurement of output occurs 
over a specified period of time (Housel & Bell, 2001). The sample period will vary from 
system to system depending on the complexity and the length of each process. After 
determining the output for a standard execution of the process and the corresponding unit 
of measure (i.e., learning time, tasks, or lines of code) is established, the output is 
multiplied by number of times each sub-process is used during the sample period (Housel 
& Bell, 2001). Next, a proportion of revenue (i.e., in for-profit organizations) is allocated 
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to each of the sub-processes relative to the results from the previous step and costs are 
calculated for each process (Housel & Bell, 2001). In the case of not-for-profits (e.g., DoD 
organizations), a market comparable aggregate revenue estimate can be calculated which 
provides a means to establish a price or revenue per common unit of output. Finally, 
analysts should determine the Return on Knowledge (ROK: monetized or non-monetized 
output divided by cost) and interpret the results (Housel & Bell, 2001). Analysts should 
use two or more estimates of output based on method selected for describing the output 
(e.g., learning time, lines of code). These estimates can then be correlated to determine the 
reliability of the estimates. Those estimate with a resulting high correlation, ensure the 
reliability of the value calculations (Housel & Bell, 2001). 
ROK, an important concept within KVA, is a ratio used to determine the value 
added from knowledge assets within the system (Housel & Bell, 2001). It is calculated by 
dividing the knowledge embedded within a process and its frequency of use by the cost 
associated with operating that process (Housel & Bell, 2001). ROK can be calculated for 
any manual or automated activity, IT system, and even management activities that have 
been observed and measured via the KVA approach due to the knowledge embedded in all 
of these processes. A higher ROK indicates more value returned for each dollar spent on 
the process (Housel & Bell, 2001). ROK gives managers a common reference point, 
objective way to examine the benefit and value of a process compared to other processes, 
allowing leadership to manage their processes within a portfolio framework to determine 
which, if any, process might benefit from moving knowledge from employees to 
automation (i.e., artificial intelligence, robotics, online applications) to make substantial 
improvements in productivity.  
Figure 12 shows a rudimentary analysis of maintenance actions within a Marine 
Corps Motor Transport platoon via the learning time method previously discussed. The 
exercise was conducted to ascertain if an IT system would improve the timeliness of 
maintenance procedures while maintaining the same value in the output (Carlton, Ellis, 
Jones, & Schofield, 2019). Total knowledge was calculated by establishing the total 
amount of formal training required to complete a given task, including initial and recurring 
training (Carlton et al., 2019). Expenses were estimated by multiplying the average salary 
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of the Marine performing the work and the average time to complete the task (Carlton et 
al., 2019). The ROK was computed by dividing the total knowledge (output within a 
productivity ratio) by the expenses (the cost component of the productivity ratio) (Carlton 
et al., 2019). After establishing the baseline, as-is measurements, the team estimated the 
time necessary to complete each task (Carlton et al., 2019). Some steps within the process 
were automated using the proposed IT system, reducing the cycle time. However, total 
knowledge remained constant since the output from both the as-is and to-be processes were 
equal. ROK form the to-be process increased compared to the as-is process, suggesting the 
proposed IT solution will either improve performance or reduce cost (Carlton et al., 2019). 
Since the total knowledge remained the same, this change suggests cost will be reduced. A 
more detailed example is presented in the next chapter. 
 
Figure 12. Sample KVA Tables. Source: Carlton et al. (2019). 
KVA is potentially an extremely valuable tool for inclusion in the Defense 
Acquisition System. Since the DoD is not a for-profit company, it does not have revenue 
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to judge the effectiveness of its programs. Instead, it relies on various metrics and 
evaluations that are not comparable from system to system. If the DoD implements the 
KVA methodology, PMs may have an objective measure to compare various technological 
solutions to fulfill requirements. Understanding the value a system or process provides in 
direct comparison with the value of other systems, whether they are similar or unrelated 
processes, and this could provide beneficial information in the decision-making, budgeting, 
and planning processes. 
E. INTEGRATED RISK MANAGEMENT 
IRM is a system developed by Dr. Jonathan Mun designed to provide management 
the ability to analysis risk associated with the development of a new project or initiative. 
IRM combines several commonly accepted analytical procedures, such as predictive 
modeling, Monte Carlo simulation, Real Options analysis, and portfolio optimization, into 
a single, comprehensive methodology. The methodology uses existing techniques and 
metrics such as discounted cash flow, ROI, and other metrics within the analytical 
processes to improve the traditional manner of evaluating potential projects within a 
company or the DoD. In contrast to the other methodologies, IRM focuses on the risk 
involved with a decision. It seeks to mitigate negative effects from risk while maximizing 
rewards from potential outcomes. At its core, IRM is a technique to provide managers the 
best analytic information available to use during the real options process. 
There are eight steps within the IRM methodology: 
1. Qualitative management screening 
2. Forecast predictive modeling 
3. Base case static modeling 
4. Monte Carlo risk simulation 
5. Real options problem framing 
6. Real options valuation and modeling 
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7. Portfolio and resource optimization 
8. Reporting, presenting, and updating analysis 
While each of the individual steps provide value to a project manager, incorporating 
all of them in a contiguous approach will allow decision makers the most effective use of 
the IRM process. 
Figure 13 illustrates the comprehensive IRM process. The process begins with a 
qualitative management screening of potential projects, assets, and initiatives that could 
benefit the organization. These potential additions to a company’s portfolio should align 
with the overall strategy, mission, and goals of the company (Mun, 2016). The risks to an 
organization must be identified and addressed for decision-makers to have a realistic 
picture of the challenges the projects may face (Mun, 2016). This step is not unique to 
IRM. Prior to a firm beginning any venture, senior leadership should ensure that the 
ventures they are funding are realistic options based on their expertise and vision. If these 
are not in alignment, the initiatives will almost certainly fail. However, by evaluating the 
suitability of the projects and programs at the outset, management can eliminate potential 
programs that are incompatible prior to additional costly analysis.  
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Figure 13. Integrated Risk Management Process. Source: Mun & Housel 
(2010). 
The second step is to forecast results using predictive modeling. Ideally, 
management will have access to historical data to use during this evaluation. Using 
comparable data from similar firms or projects is an acceptable alternative when the 
historical information is not available. When analysts have access to this data, they will use 
techniques such as multivariate regression analysis, time-series analysis, and others to 
predict a project’s performance (Mun, 2016). If the data are unavailable, qualitative 
forecasting methods and subject matter expert estimates can be substituted for the historical 
or comparable information (Mun, 2016). The qualitative techniques can vary from 
assumptions about the growth rate to expert opinions, subjective estimates, and the Delphi 
method (Mun, 2016). In both cases, the techniques are forecasting value and cost drivers 
within the project (e.g., quantity, volume, production, revenue, cost, schedule, etc.) (Mun, 
2016). In a nonprofit context such as the DoD acquisition life cycle, surrogates should be 
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used for revenue. The metrics that will define the value of a project can be projected in this 
analysis in place of for-profit financial measurements.  
Using the results from the forecasting step, a model of discounted cash flow or 
similar models with a future projection of cost and benefit is created for each project, which 
serves as the base case analysis for future decisions (Mun, 2016). The net present value 
(NPV) or other ROI for the initiative is calculated via the traditional method, i.e., projecting 
both revenue and cost and discounting the net value at an appropriate rate adjusted for 
standard financial risks (Mun, 2016). Additional profitability, productivity, and cost-
benefit metrics, such as other variations of return on investment, are calculated during this 
phase (Mun, 2016). The DoD and other nonprofit organizations do not collect revenue, 
making the profitability ratios listed meaningless without a surrogate for revenue. (KVA 
offers this surrogate in the form of value. Using KVA as the base case analysis allows a 
quantitative, common-units comparison of nonprofit projects in the same manner as a 
traditional, revenue-generating industry.) 
Next, the analyst will conduct a Monte Carlo risk simulation to obtain a better 
assessment of the potential risks and value of the proposed venture. While the base case 
static model developed in step three is a useful tool, it is based on static information and, 
as such, produces a single-point estimate (Mun, 2016). The information gleaned from the 
model may not be accurate due to the uncertainty and risks involved in future cash flows 
(Mun, 2016). Since financial problems inherently contain uncertainty of some form, a 
model that accounts for this uncertainty is necessary (Brandimarte, 2014). The Monte Carlo 
simulation will increase confidence in the value of a project by using statistical analysis to 
give a probability of ranges for different variables.  
Monte Carlo simulation, also known as probability simulation, “is a technique used 
to understand the impact of risk and uncertainty in financial, project management, cost, 
and other forecasting models” (Risk Amp, n.d., p. 1). In a Monte Carlo simulation, analysts 
generate random scenarios and gather relevant statistics to assess situations that are 
affected by uncertainty (Brandimarte, 2014). Using historical data and the opinions of 
subject matter experts, analysts can input a range of possible values to simulate potential 
future outcomes (Risk Amp, n.d.). Since the input variables are given in a range of 
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estimates, the model’s outputs will also be a range indicating the likelihood of the 
possibilities. (Risk Amp, n.d.). The Monte Carlo simulation can also be run using only 
historical data and the computer will make a custom distribution of the variables to produce 
its output or with a prescribed probability distribution (Mun, 2015). In IRM, the analyst 
will set NPV or any of the computed ROI variations as the resulting variable(s) and run the 
Monte Carlo simulation thousands of times, adjusting each of the other variables to predict 
a range and probability of potential NPVs for the project (Mun, 2015). 
The quantitative data gleaned from the Monte Carlo simulation is only useful if it 
provides decision-makers with improved information to make decisions. The information 
must be converted into actionable intelligence (Mun, 2016). While the statistical analysis 
and other preceding steps are important, the crux of the IRM methodology is the real 
options assessment. To begin that process, leaders must conduct real options problem 
framing, step five in the IRM methodology. Real options allow managers to hedge, value, 
and take advantage of risks, reducing the potential downside while maximizing potential 
gains from volatile projects (Mun, 2016). By framing the problem through a real options 
lens, an organization’s leadership can generate a strategic plan for the problem from several 
options, (Mun, 2016). Analysts will then examine chosen options in more detail (Mun, 
2016). 
Real options provide investors the ability to adjust the course of previous decisions 
based on the performance of the investment to date. They allow management to make 
“better and more informed strategic decisions when some levels of uncertainty are resolved 
through the passage of time, actions, and events” (Mun, 2015, p. 438). Options are 
opportunities for a company; they have a right to conduct an action without the obligation 
to take the future action (Dixit & Pindyck, 1995). There are several types of options and 
the number of names of available options varies depending on the literature source. Some 
of the more common categories are briefly covered below.  
The option to delay gives managers the ability to adjust the timing of a project 
(Damodaran, 2000). When analyzing the cash flows of a project, a negative NPV or ROI 
indicates a project is not a good investment at the current time (Damodaran, 2000). As 
illustrated in Figure 14, waiting until the NPV turns positive allows an organization the 
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option to delay the initiative until it will benefit the company. NPV is not the sole source 
to make an option decision within IRM and is included to illustrate the concept in a simple 
manner. The statistical analysis conducted in previous steps allows analysts to determine 
the optimal time to make project investment decisions. This option is also referred to as a 
deferment option, option to wait, or option to execute (Mun, 2015). The option to delay is 
often executed through pre-negotiated prices or similar contracted terms that offer the 
choice to purchase something without an obligation to do so (Mun, 2015). These terms 
could include options based on a build, buy, or lease contract; a proof of concept test; 
market research; research and development; or other negotiated terms (Mun, 2015).  
 
Figure 14. The Option to Delay. Source: Damodaran (2000). 
The option to abandon a project provides management a way to reduce future losses 
in a project that is not performing as anticipated (Damodaran, 2000). Figure 15 shows one 
example when the option to abandon should be considered. As the present value of the 
project decreases below the liquidation or salvage value of the project, managers should 
abandon the project and salvage as much as possible from the existing infrastructure and 
investment (Damodaran, 2000). Salvage is not the only way to execute the option to 
abandon. Companies can also execute the option to abandon through contractual buyback 
provisions, termination for convenience, divestitures, or early exit clauses (Mun, 2016). 
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Figure 15. The Option to Abandon. Source: Damodaran (2000). 
A third real option available to leaders is the option to expand (Damodaran, 2000). 
In this instance, an investment in a project allows a company to undertake additional 
projects or to enter new markets, expanding the scope of the original investment 
(Damodaran, 2000). While not always the case, businesses may be willing to accept a 
negative NPV for the initial project to have access to the expansion options it will create 
with the promise of higher NPVs (Damodaran, 2000). By investing in the original initiative 
and maintaining the option to expand, the company is limiting the potential upside from an 
initial investment into the entire project; however, it is also reducing the downside risk of 
a failed, high capital investment (Damodaran, 2000). For example, a company may 
recognize a potential market in creating a suite of sensors for a new autonomous vehicle. 
Without the existing infrastructure to compete in this market, leadership decides to develop 
a project that will create a single sensor for the vehicle. When the project is completed, 
managers assess the financial feasibility of creating additional sensors. The original 
investment must be a requirement for the subsequent project to be an option to expand. 
That is, the additional sensors could not be developed without the investment into the first 
sensor. Otherwise, these are simply a collection of separate but related projects. 
Other real option strategies include barrier options, chooser options, contraction 
options, sequential options, and switching options (Mun, 2016). Barrier options become 
available when an artificial barrier is either breached or not breached (e.g., profits exceed 
a certain level or vendor prices fall below a specified threshold) (Mun, 2015). Chooser 
options permit management to choose between one or multiple strategies, such as 
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expanding, abandoning, etc. (Mun, 2015). Contraction options allow a firm to contract its 
existing operations to cut operating expenses under certain conditions (Mun, 2015). This 
could happen through outsourcing, subcontracting, leasing, or other alternatives (Mun, 
2015). Sequential options require a previous option to successfully finish prior to initiating 
a subsequent option, compounding the options and reducing the downside risk from a large 
up-front investment (Mun, 2015). Finally, switching options provide management the 
ability to switch operating conditions, such as technologies, markets, or products (Mun, 
2015). This type of option gives a firm strategic flexibility in choosing a course of action, 
keeping its current project while exploring possible substitutions (Mun, 2015). 
After determining which real option may be appropriate, analysts conduct 
simulations on the chosen options to complete the real options valuation and modeling. 
The results from the Monte Carlo simulation and previous evaluations give a probability 
distribution of values that illustrate the uncertainties and risks associated with each project, 
which, when combined, give a distribution of the NPVs and the initiative’s volatility (Mun, 
2016). The assumption within a real options context is that future profitability of the project 
is the fundamental variable of interest, measured by future cash flow series (Mun, 2016). 
Analysts use the future cash flow and the present value of the future cash flows to determine 
the total asset value of the project in a real options model (Mun, 2016).  
The real options analysis reveals the financial and economic strengths and 
weaknesses of the project’s available strategic options, allowing analysts to make 
recommendations to management on which projects to pursue. Projects are typically not 
conducted individually within businesses and initiatives are often correlated (Mun, 2016). 
If managers view the future projects as a portfolio, they can hedge and diversify the risks 
associated with each singular project (Mun, 2016). Using traditional portfolio analysis will 
assist leadership in determining the optimal allocation of investments throughout their 
collection of projects (Mun, 2016). 
Generating coherent and concise reports detailing the analysis is the eighth, and 
final, step in IRM (Mun, 2016). If decision-makers do not understand the complicated 
procedures that led to the investment recommendations, they will not trust the results 
enough to follow those recommendations (Mun, 2016). Transforming the “black-box set 
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of analytics into transparent steps” is vital to ensuring leadership has the best possible 
information with which to make decisions for the company’s project portfolio (Mun, 2016, 
p. 95). Although this is the final step within the IRM process, as additional information 
becomes available and the uncertainty and risk are reduced or resolved, analysts should 
revisit the models with updated information (Mun, 2016). Reworking the original models 
with the new data allows managers to make midcourse corrections to improve the 
performance of both the individual project and the portfolio of projects (Mun, 2016).  
The IRM methodology is a systematic technique to determine the best possible 
projects to pursue based on the statistical likelihood of their success. Using historical 
knowledge of defense acquisition programs and IT systems in both the government and 
commercial realms could improve the budgeting and scheduling processes. Determining 
the likely range of outcomes through dynamic statistical modeling may improve the 
program’s performance. By better understanding the risk associated with various 
components, a more appropriate schedule and budget could be developed. IRM may also 
help determine which real options should be included in acquisition contracts. A high-risk 
program may need more options, such as the options to abandon, delay, or expand, based 
on its actual performance. Finally, IRM could prove useful in portfolio management, 
helping decision-makers determine which programs to initiate when viewing the portfolio 
of other programs in progress and used operationally. 
F. LEAN SIX SIGMA 
Currently employed as a means to help justify the future use of an IT system to 
incrementally improve process productivity within the DoD, LSS is a combination of two 
complementary concepts, Lean and Six Sigma, designed to eliminate waste and variation 
to attain customer satisfaction in the areas of quality, delivery, and cost (Salah, Rahim, & 
Carretero, 2010). Six Sigma evolved from the Total Quality Management (TQM) program 
and is focused on reducing variability and removing defects within a process (Apte & 
Kang, 2006). The Lean concept centers on reducing waste and increasing the speed of a 
process (Apte & Kang, 2006). In the past, practitioners often chose one concept or the 
other, believing the two approaches to be contradictory in nature (Apte & Kang, 2006). 
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However, many managers now view the concepts as synergistic (Apte & Kang, 2006). 
Together, they lead to the ultimate goal of a continuous process flow via a cycle of iterative 
improvement. 
The Lean foundation centers on the production of a product and its associated value 
stream while eliminating all waste within the system (Pepper & Spedding, 2009). Lean 
processes use the absolute minimum resources necessary to create the value for a service 
or product (Apte & Kang, 2006). Any process that does not add value is considered waste 
(Apte & Kang, 2006). To effectively eliminate waste, managers must determine what adds 
value to the system. In this model, value added activities are “those activities that the 
customer would pay and that add value for the customer” (Cudney, Furterer, & Dietrich, 
2013, p. 41). Conversely, if a customer does not consider an activity valuable or would not 
pay for an activity, it is a non-value-added activity (Cudney et al., 2013). Many non-value-
added activities are required to deliver a product or run a business, such as accounting 
departments, process documentation, transportation, etc. (Cudney et al., 2013). Other non-
value-added activities exist because of inefficiencies in a process, such as material storage, 
delays in a process, etc. (Cudney et al., 2013). Value-added activities typically make up 
only 1–5% of the total process time, while the remaining 95–99% consists of non-value-
added activities (Cudney et al, 2013). Leadership must determine which steps in the 
development of a product or service add value to the customer and reduce the non-value-
added activities, resulting in a more efficient, or lean, process. 
The term “Six Sigma” refers to the statistical measurement of the defect rate for a 
particular system (Pepper & Spedding, 2009). The goal of the Six Sigma process is to 
improve customer satisfaction, thereby increasing profit, by reducing the defects in the 
system (Apte & Kang, 2006). For military customers, this could be reducing defects that 
provide false information, cause delays in prosecuting targets, lead to component failure or 
inaccuracy, or any other defects present in the civilian sector. If a system operates with an 
efficiency of six sigma from its measure of perfection, there will be only 3.4 defects per 
million items (Apte & Kang, 2006). Most companies operate between three and four sigma, 
losing 10–15% of the company’s total revenue due to defects (Apte & Kang, 2006). In 
some service-based industries, such as the financial sector, even a defect rate of six sigma 
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is considered unacceptable (Apte & Kang, 2006). As a result, “Six Sigma” now refers to 
the continual effort to eliminate defects and reduce variation in order to deliver a reliable, 
high-quality product or service to the customer (Apte & Kang, 2006). Achieving these 
results stems from an organizational culture and infrastructure designed on continuous 
process improvement (Apte & Kang, 2006).  
Combining the Lean and Six Sigma methodologies, LSS involves five key phases: 
define, measure, analyze, improve, and control (DMAIC) (Pepper & Spedding, 2009). 
Within the LSS methodology, managers can choose to focus on different aspects of 
improvement before moving on to other areas. For example, leadership may decide to 
concentrate on the Lean component of improvement by eliminating waste rather than on 
the Six Sigma elements of reducing variation (Apte & Kang, 2006). Which tactic to utilize 
will vary depending on the situation, with accuracy or completeness issues typically 
resolved using Six Sigma and Lean aspects applied to timeliness or productivity complaints 
(Apte & Kang, 2006). Figure 16 shows various tools that can be used within the various 
phases. Some of these tools may be used in different phases depending on the project 
manager’s implementation.  
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Figure 16. Lean Six Sigma DMAIC Process and Tools. Source: Cudney & 
Kestle (2011). 
In the define phase, managers gain understanding into what provides value to a 
customer (Salah et al., 2010). Identifying and delineating the problem is the first step in the 
define phase, which is often done by creating a project charter to express the scope and 
goals of the project (Cudney et al., 2013). Next, the PM must determine who the customers 
and stakeholders are in the process before conducting stakeholder analysis to understand 
the roles and concerns of the various parties as well as their attitudes toward potential 
change (Cudney et al., 2013). According to Cudney et al., uncovering the initial voice of 
the customer gives insight to the needs and items that are critical to their satisfaction (2013). 
After determining this information, the leader must form a team consisting of individuals 
with the appropriate knowledge and commitment to advance the project before the final 
step of creating a project plan to track progress through the remaining phases (Cudney et 
al., 2013). 
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The measurement phase, phase two of the DMAIC process, determines the baseline 
performance for the as-is process (Salah et al., 2010). To understand the performance, the 
project team must map the process in detail and establish the operational definitions, 
metrics, and data collection techniques they will use throughout the project (Cudney et al., 
2013). At this point, the team will map the value stream, revealing which steps are value-
added and which are non-value added (Salah et al., 2010). Benchmarking, histograms, 
Pareto charts, and other techniques may be used to measure the current performance, which 
may illuminate problems in the system during this phase (Cudney et al., 2013). Finally, the 
measurement system must be validated to ensure the correct data is captured and the data 
matches the actual system output (Cudney et al., 2013). 
The purpose of phase three, analyze, is to identify the root cause of problems within 
a process based on the information gathered during the measurement phase (Cudney et al., 
2013). The five whys (Figure 17) is one technique the team can use to determine the root 
cause and effect for issues discovered in the process (Apte & Kang, 2006). For each issue, 
asking why that incident occurred leads to a deeper cause. By asking enough times why a 
customer left, the team could have discovered the product orders were insufficient, 
preventing the customer from making a purchase. The phase also includes waste analysis. 
LSS identifies eight waste categories that add cost to a product without adding value: 
transportation of people, equipment, tools, etc.; overproduction of material; unnecessary 
motion; defects in a product; delay while waiting for people or equipment; storing 
inventory; excessive processing not desired by the customer; and failing to utilize people’s 
talents (Cudney et al., 2013).  
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Figure 17. Five Whys Diagram. Source: Cudney et al. (2013).  
After analyzing the process, team members seek to improve the production or 
service method, which is the fourth step of the DMAIC model. The purpose of this phase 
is identifying improvement recommendations, designing the to-be system, developing pilot 
programs as needed, and training employees in the new techniques (Cudney et al., 2013). 
The “5 S system” (sort, straighten, scrub, stabilize, sustain) can help managers determine 
methods to better organize a workplace and eliminate or reduce many types of waste. 
Teams should sort or simplify by removing unnecessary elements in the workplace, 
straighten and organize items so they are more easily used and returned, scrub to fix the 
root cause of disorganization, stabilize processes after implementing changes from the first 
3 S’s, and sustain the practice by continually using the 5 S method (Cudney et al., 2013). 
Recommendations should stem from the discoveries made during the analysis phase to 
ensure the root cause of an issue is addressed rather than resulting in an action designed to 
cover a symptom of the root cause (Cudney et al., 2013). Depending on the 
recommendations, it may be worthwhile to conduct a cost-benefit analysis prior to applying 
any new changes to ensure the cost of the improved system is worth implementation 
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(Cudney et al., 2013). Teams should document the standard operating procedures and 
revised process map for the to-be system prior to beginning the action plan so that 
improvements to the system can be easily recognized (Salah et al., 2010). Mistake-proofing 
techniques should be developed and inserted into processes to safeguard from accidents 
and oversights causing errors in the final product (Salah et al., 2010). Employees should 
then receive training in the updated procedures prior to their implementation to assure 
consistency in the revised process (Cudney et al., 2013). 
The control phase is the final phase of the DMAIC process and is designed to 
maintain the improvements to the system gained during the improvement phase (Cudney 
& Kestle, 2011). To accomplish this, a team must validate the results compared to the 
baseline measurement, create a process control plan, and turn over responsibility to the 
process manager (Salah et al., 2010). If there is not a conscious effort to maintain the gains 
resulting from the improved process, employees will most likely revert to the original 
manner, slipping back into the familiar, inefficient routines (Cudney et al., 2013). A control 
plan should include methods to prevent this from occurring and measurement techniques 
that alert management of potential pitfalls (Cudney et al., 2013). Mistake-proofing must 
continue in the control phase whenever possible to reduce the need for rework and 
eliminate waste resulting from defects (Cudney et al., 2013). Finally, the team must 
document lessons learned during the LSS improvement process to ease the burden for 
future projects (Cudney et al., 2013). 
There are numerous examples of the DoD implementing LSS within military 
programs. Naval Air Systems Command saved over $133 million during 2006 and more 
than $420 million across the entire life of the Joint Standoff Weapon Block II program 
after applying LSS (Robinson, 2008). The Army Red River Depot overhauled their 
Humvee refitting operations with a LSS mindset, increasing the number of vehicles they 
processed from three a day to twenty-three a day (Robinson, 2008). The next chapter will 
explore an example case of LSS within the DoD to determine its suitability within the 
acquisition of IS and IT systems. 
To effectively implement an LSS project, an organization must have the appropriate 
support structure. In his 2010 book Six Sigma, Deepali Desai explains that LSS cannot be 
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employed exclusively from a single branch, such as quality control; it must instead 
permeate throughout the company to achieve the desired results. He notes that there is a 
regimented, consistent with the rest of the program, prescriptive staffing structure within 
companies that utilize LSS. The executive leadership group decides whether to implement 
an LSS program, and their public support throughout the company is essential for the 
program’s success while champions or project sponsors advocate for projects to the 
executive leadership on behalf of the team leaders (Desai, 2010). Additional roles and 
responsibilities within the Six Sigma methodology are defined by belt levels attained 
through LSS certification. Desai explains that master black belts are experts within all 
aspects of LSS and have extensive academic training and field experience with the program 
and serve as mentors and guides for the team leaders and as black belts within a company. 
Team leaders are black belts assigned to projects based on their training and experience 
and serve as the technical experts and change agents within a team and run the DMAIC 
process for a project (Desai, 2010). Desai goes on to say, master black belts and black belts 
are full-time LSS employees within the organization, using their expertise to improve 
processes and maintain the improvements. Green belts are individuals that have received 
LSS training and have some real-world experience with LSS implementation (Desai, 
2010). The author observed that some companies train large portions of their workforce at 
the green and white belt level so their employees can bring LSS concepts and tools into 
their daily activities. He further noted addition to the belt holders, team members are 
individuals assisting with LSS projects in the DMAIC process. Teams often consist of three 
to ten members from various branches within a company relevant to the process being 
improved and although team members may or may not possess an LSS belt, they should 
be familiar with LSS concepts (Desai, 2010). 
LSS is an effective technique to improve the processes within a system. A detailed 
understanding of a procedure is required prior to implementing any changes to a process. 
This acumen could give decision-makers insight in to the as-is system, that is, the current 
process or system the acquisition program is seeking to improve. Having a firm grasp on 
the as-is system may assist the PM when deciding the best course of action to fulfill stated 
requirements. LSS offers the most benefit when applied to processes that are already 
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established. Incrementally improving procedures during the operations and support phase 
may provide significant cost savings and improved performance over the life of an 
acquisition.  
G. SUMMARY 
The Defense Acquisition System is a complicated process. Each of the five 
methodologies reviewed— EVM, BSC, KVA, IRM, and LSS— are valuable tools with 
different benefits and drawbacks and could be used in different applications. There are 
potential places within the acquisition process to insert these methodologies, or portions of 
the methodologies, to improve the acquisition of IS. Case studies conducted in the 
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III. CASE VIGNETTES 
Parts of this chapter were previously published by the Naval Postgraduate School 
Acquisition Research Program (Housel, Mun, Jones, & Carlton, 2019). 
 
This chapter reviews examples from several cases that used one or more of the five 
methodologies. Some of these cases deal with actual systems while others use hypothetical 
examples detailing how a methodology may be used in the given circumstances. 
A. JOINT TACTICAL RADIO SYSTEM: EVM 
EVM measures the progress of a project based on the cost spent on the project (the 
ACWP) and the amount of work completed at a given time (the BCWP) compared to the 
amount of work that should be completed at that point (the BCWS). Comparing these 
metrics shows project managers any CV and SV from the baseline. Project managers have 
used these techniques for many years with success, especially in traditional manufacturing 
programs. However, there are issues with the methodology when it is applied to complex 
programs, such as integrated hardware/software systems. The Joint Tactical Radio System 
(JTRS) case is an example of the government’s use of EVM in an IS acquisition that 
required both hardware and software development. 
JTRS was a DoD program designed to create a software-defined network of radios 
that would link platforms from across the services across the spectrum of existing 
capability. The DoD initiated the JTRS program in 1997 as part of an effort to update 
equipment in concert with the concept of network-centric warfare (Francis, 2006). JTRS 
was envisioned to be a group of software-defined radios that would replace the 25 to 30 
families of radios used in the military during the mid-1990s (Feickert, 2005). The radios 
were to operate across the entirety of the radio frequency spectrum, allowing wireless 
voice, data, and video communication seamlessly between all services (Feickert, 2005). 
The hundreds of thousands of radios the DoD planned to acquire would allow warfighters 
to access maps and other visual data, directly view battlefield sensors, and communicate 
via voice and video (Francis, 2006). 
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In his 2006 Government Accountability Office Report, Paul Francis explained that 
software-defined radios, such as JTRS, use software to control the operation of a radio 
rather than hardware as used in traditional radio operation. He described waveforms as the 
software applications the radio uses to transmit messages, including the frequency, 
modulation, message format, and/or transmission system. The report noted that JTRS was 
designed for a single radio to transmit multiple types of waveforms, allowing a single radio 
to communicate with different types of legacy radio systems and other JTRS. The radios 
would be able to operate on multiple waveforms simultaneously depending on the number 
of channels in the radio, meaning a single radio could transmit and receive video, data and 
voice communications at the same time (Francis, 2006). Figure 18 demonstrates the reach 
and some of the various platforms JTRS would utilize once full operational capability was 
attained. Since the radios must operate on a battlefield in any environment, JTRS was 
designed to operate without any fixed infrastructure such as cell phone towers or fiber optic 
lines, and all network components had to have enough power to transmit data over long 
distances while maintaining connectivity and security of the information (Francis, 2006). 
Francis noted that “the development of the individual waveforms and their ability to 




Figure 18. JTRS Operational Overview. Source: Francis (2006). 
The original program was designed to establish a universal DoD standard in which 
the services could develop independent hardware solutions using a common network 
architecture. Table 1 illustrates the five original clusters and their respective leads. Based 
on research suggesting a combined approach would result in a more efficient process with 
improved results, clusters three and four were merged in 2004, forming the JTRS Airborne, 
Maritime, and Fixed Station (AMF) cluster jointly managed by the Air Force and the Navy 
(Feickert, 2005). However, the programs were not managed correctly and changes needed 
to occur. For instance, cluster one began development on the Wideband Networking 
Waveform, the main waveform for use in Army units, with “an aggressive schedule, 
immature technology, and a lack of clearly defined and stable requirements” (Francis, 





Table 1. JTRS Clusters. Source: Feickert (2005) 
 
 
After several years of slow performance by the services to develop new JTRS radio 
products, the DoD developed the JTRS joint program office, realigning all clusters under 
a single Joint Program Executive Officer (JPEO) (Francis, 2006). The slow progress was 
likely due to the marginal budgets allocated to common architecture efforts prior to 2001 
and the changing priorities due to the war in Afghanistan and Iraq. Consequently, the JTRS 
enterprise was chartered to consolidate the various clusters and develop an acquisition 
strategy that would accelerate the networking capability across the DoD. Additionally, in 
2002 the Army’s Future Combat System acquisition strategy was accelerated, mandating 
that a new consolidated approach toward delivering the network was required in order to 
meet these goals.  
The JTRS JPEO established five ACAT ID program offices aligned around the 
original clusters, Ground Mobile Radio (GMR), Handheld Mobile System (HMS), 
Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS), AMF, and Network Enterprise 
Domain (NED), shown in Figure 19. These programs were intended to be interoperable 
with each other via the various waveforms being developed by NED. Unfortunately, the 
JPEO for JTRS failed to realign the acquisition strategies between the programs and 
allowed each program to develop independent operating environments that were not 
compatible with each other. The unintended impact of this strategy required each program 
to develop a different version of the basic waveforms in order to work on their platforms. 
This was a significant driver in the escalating cost for waveform development across the 
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JTRS enterprise. Additionally, the acquisition strategies across the enterprise were not 
synchronized toward a common DoD architecture resulting in a disconnected operational 
capability. Ultimately, the inability of the various JTRS hardware solutions to create the 
intended integrated DoD network began to erode support for the system, and the increasing 
demands of the Global War on Terrorism led the DoD to search for different network 
strategies leading to the termination of the JTRS enterprise as an organization. 
 
Figure 19. JTRS Program Structure. Source: Housel et al. (2019) 
The inability to anticipate the logical outcome of the JTRS enterprise may lie in the 
DoD’s failure to recognize the need for better and different ways to actually manage and 
control complex hardware/software programs. Per the statutory requirements, JPEO used 
EVM to manage the production of the JTRS program. According to Col (Ret.) Raymond 
Jones, former PM and deputy PEO of the JTRS program, the WBS divided the necessary 
tasks into various blocks of work typical of the EVM process (personal communication, 
September 12, 2019). The project schedule was based on the estimated completion dates 
of the different components within the WBS (R. Jones, personal communication, 
September 12, 2019). Establishing a viable WBS for an integrated hardware/software 
program was not possible due to the uncertainty of software development and the lack of 
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management control on the quality of software being delivered to the JTRS software 
repository by NED and the participating vendors. The hardware programs had little voice 
in the quality control and schedules being used by NED, the program office responsible for 
delivering the software waveforms to the hardware program offices. Consequently, it was 
virtually impossible for the hardware program offices to logically establish a valid 
performance measurement baseline (PMB) for their programs since the disparate program 
operating environments for each of the radio programs was constantly being changed 
because of the uncertainty of the waveform development. In order to establish an effective 
PMB, a program must have some level of certainty in the WBS. Lacking this certainty 
leads to a variable baseline that is not manageable using traditional methods. 
Unfortunately, the DoD mandates the use of legacy methods, reinforced by antiquated 
legislation such as Nunn-McCurdy, driving programs to use management tools that are 
ineffective in complex integrated hardware/software programs. While measuring programs 
using the traditional PMB methods was suitable for more predictable, less complex 
programs, it is not sufficient to provide insight into dynamic integrated programs that are 
dependent on the uncertainty of capability development methods with potentially limitless 
permutations of solutions driven by individuals such as software developers.  
Without end-to-end synchronization of requirements across the entire capability 
set, trying to develop software hardware solutions in a coherent manner is not possible. 
Perhaps the simplest analogy might be the difference between Apple’s IOS and Google’s 
Android system architecture. It is not possible to run IOS apps on an Android architecture, 
nor do these companies attempt to do so. Yet in the DoD, the acquisition leadership actually 
created a program structure that tried to do exactly that. Each of the radio programs had 
different operating environments (think iOS versus Android) with the expectation that the 
waveforms being developed by NED and its contractors were actually going to work on all 
of the radio programs without significant change. In fact, while the waveforms were called 
the same thing on each platform, they were actually fundamentally different and not 
interoperable. 
Understanding the fundamental challenges experienced by JTRS is critical to 
understanding why current management controls are not sufficient for managing complex 
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hardware/software programs. A primary measure of progress in the JTRS program was the 
use of lines of code (LOC) completed. Software development progress was tracked using 
LOC, meaning software developers estimated how many LOC were needed to complete 
the different elements of the WBS (R. Jones, personal communication, August 22, 2019). 
Rather than establishing capability measures that can be discretely measured, completion 
rate of LOC drove the perception that software was being completed in support of the PMB. 
LOC is not an accurate method to estimate cost and schedule for a program developing 
new technology that does not have similarly complex software on which to base the 
estimates. When developing the schedule, a software developer approximated the cost and 
time needed to write the stated LOC for the task, which had a risk factor added to account 
for unknown and unexpected issues (R. Jones, personal communication, August 22, 2019). 
When deadlines arrived for delivery of software that was not yet completed, 
developers would deliver a preliminary version of the program, promising a fully 
functional version later (R. Jones, personal communication, September 12, 2019). For 
example, if the schedule called for software delivery to complete a task on the ground and 
aviation platforms but the software was only functional for the ground component, they 
may deliver version 3.0 on deadline with the promise of 3.0.1 a month later (R. Jones, 
personal communication, September 22, 2019). However, PMs developed the schedule 
assuming the entire software would be completed on schedule; the resulting software delay 
also pushed back the aviation program schedule that depended on the software to continue 
its development (R. Jones, personal communication, September 22, 2019). 
The program used forward leaning technology and the schedule was planned years 
in advance using predictions of future processing capabilities including Moore’s Law, 
which states the number of transistors in a circuit doubles every two years, increasing the 
processing power (R. Jones, personal communication, August 22, 2019). None of the 20 
critical technologies identified for cluster one were mature when system development 
began (Francis, 2008). While Moore’s Law held true during this time, the necessary 
advances needed to complete the design requirements were not always available per the 
baseline schedule. For instance, as advances in technology occurred, the aviation radio 
design fit within the specified dimensions (R. Jones, personal communication, August 22, 
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2019). However, the reduction in size led to overheating issues with the equipment as the 
airflow over the heat syncs was insufficient (R. Jones, personal communication, August 
22, 2019). These issues (and others) caused unforeseen delays that significantly affected 
the cost and schedule baseline.  
The JTRS program continued to have issues through its development, and many of 
the larger components of the program were canceled. The GMR, originally part of cluster 
one, did not undergo testing by operational users until 2010, 13 years after the project’s 
inception (Gallagher, 2012). One of the main subprograms within JTRS, the GMR 
eventually received certification for the hardware portion of the radio in May 2012 
(Gallagher, 2012). Unfortunately, Undersecretary of Defense Kendall had already canceled 
the GMR in October 2011, citing a reduction in quantity required by the services (Kendall, 
2011). The reduction in the number of radios requested stemmed from the increasing price 
of individual radios (Francis, 2008). The JPEO officially closed on September 30, 2012, 
and the Joint Tactical Networking Center was given the responsibilities related to 
developing and sustaining software defined radios (Roosevelt, 2012). Elements of the 
JTRS program are still being developed. HMS and the AMF radios continue the 
development begun during the JTRS process (Dodaro, 2019). However, there are still 
problems associated with these systems. HMS has seen a 133% increase in its development 
cost, a 45.88% increase in acquisition time, and a 17.5% reduction in the total quantity 
requested from 2004 to 2019 due to issues with immature technology, even with a reduction 
in the complexity of requirements (Dodaro, 2019). 
The JTRS acquisition was relatively standard for the acquisition of IS, using EVM 
and the RMF as the typical methods required by federal regulation (R. Jones, personal 
communication, September 22, 2019). According to Powner’s GAO report in 2009, the 
JTRS HMS program used EVM successfully. Of the eleven key practices the GAO 
identified within EVM, the program fully completed ten of them and partially met the last 
practice, “schedule the work.” Figure 20 shows the GAO assessment and key practices. 
The program received praise for constant reviews to validate the baseline although the 
“schedule contained some weaknesses, such as out-of-sequence logic and activities without 
resources assigned,” which were blamed on subcontractor schedules that are integrated 
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monthly (Powner, 2009, p. 42). Nevertheless, the program had significant CV and SV, 
indicating EVM did not provide sufficient information in a timely manner to correct these 
issues. 
 
Figure 20. GAO Review of JTRS HMS Key EVM Practices.  
Source: Powner (2009). 
B. BSC FRAMEWORK IN ACQUISITIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF 
THE NAVY  
BSC can be applied to the Defense Acquisition System. Strategies and visions for 
future force composition are disseminated throughout the DoD on a regular basis. The 
acquisition community could create specific metrics to ensure its actions align with high-
level policy. Terry Buss and David Cooke developed the following vignette in 2005 as a 
framework for implementing BSC within the acquisition process. 
Then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld sought to run the DoD in line with a 
more corporate structure than it had been previously, leading to a more business-like focus 
that included strategic plans and goals to achieve the desired end state (Buss & Cooke, 
2005). Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition 
(ASN[RD&A]) John Young, Jr., led his Blueprint for the Future with the vision that Naval 
acquisitions must “build a strategic capability to strike anyone, anywhere, anytime” 
(Young, 2004). Three principles along with specific goals guided the organization toward 
his vision:  
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• Principle 1: The Naval Acquisition Team must think like a business and 
run a tight ship.  
• Principle 2: The Naval Acquisition Team must innovate and collaborate 
to deliver effective, affordable weapons for Sailors and Marines. 
• Principle 3: The Naval Acquisition Team will operate as a neighborhood 
to jointly integrate systems and develop people. (Buss & Cooke, 2005, 
pp. 212–213) 
The ASN developed a BSC blueprint for the organization to utilize, shown in Figure 
21. The categories are similar to the traditional BSC groupings. Internal Business Processes 
looks at what must be done to excel (Buss & Cooke, 2005). Learning and Growth examines 
how to continue improvement and how to create value (Buss & Cooke, 2005). The 
customer for naval acquisitions is the Warfighter and this category asks how the warfighter 
sees the acquisition community (Buss & Cooke, 2005). The financial perspective is 
replaced with weapons systems—how acquisitions spends its money—and examines if the 
expenditures are providing the best capabilities for the warfighter (Buss & Cooke, 2005). 
 
Figure 21.  Four BSC Perspectives of the ASN. Source: Buss & Cooke 
(2005). 
Leaders gain the strategic guidance needed to develop BSC measures from a variety 
of sources. The National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy (formerly the 
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Quadrennial Defense Review), and National Military Strategy provide top-level guidance 
for the current vision and strategy of the DoD (Buss & Cooke, 2005). The Defense Planning 
Guidance provides direction, priorities, and goals for military acquisitions. The civilian 
and military heads of each service also provide input for their ideal force structure and 
equipment. While some of these visions may be inconsistent with each other, the 
overarching vision for naval acquisitions is taken from these sources (Buss & Cooke, 
2005). For PMs to effectively use BSC within their area of influence, they should 
understand the strategic vision of the level immediately superseding their program and 
develop metrics based on these goals.  
When using the vision to create a BSC approach, leaders must focus their metrics 
on areas beyond cost, schedule, and risk (Buss & Cooke, 2005). They must include metrics 
that enhance performance in every BSC category. They should be specific, measurable, 
assignable, relevant, and time-based (SMART) metrics that are tied to outcomes of 
performance rather than to activities (Buss & Cooke, 2005). Metrics development and 
implementation begins at the top level within the Department of the Navy (DoN) and works 
down with an increasing amount of detail at each level (Buss & Cooke, 2005). The DoN 
vision leads to metrics for both long-term goals for capabilities and transformation that 
must be useful to decision-makers and managers and effective at driving change and 
managing performance (Buss & Cooke, 2005). The span of control decreases for each level 
down from the strategic guidance, meaning the impacts of decisions made at each level 
also decrease (Buss & Cooke, 2005). However, the measurements at the lower levels must 
act like a pyramid, supporting the measures of the level above them (Buss & Cooke, 2005). 
As managers throughout the organization develop metrics for their level of control, 
they need to consider the need for baseline reviews, performance data collection and 
analysis, performance measurement, flexibility, community involvement, and institutional 
commitment (Buss & Cooke, 2005). There are several other challenges when creating 
metrics. As civilian leaders such as the president and members of Congress and senior 
leaders within the DoD change, the BSC must be flexible enough to deal with the change 
in control and focus (Buss & Cooke, 2005). Even when leaders are anticipating future 
changes, unforeseen events such as the end of the Cold War or the terrorist attacks of 
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September 11, 2001, can have dramatic effects on the DoD’s vision (Buss & Cooke, 2005). 
With numerous stakeholders, it can prove difficult to gain consensus on proposed metrics 
(Buss & Cooke, 2005). Some metrics are defined by law and policy, even if the metrics do 
not fit the current vision within the DoD. Laws such as the Government Performance and 
Results Act of 1993 and Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (along with numerous others) 
dictate some measurements that must be integrated into any BSC criteria (Buss & Cooke, 
2005). 
Using the guidance received from their leaders, managers develop the measures, 
targets, and initiatives to accomplish their specific goals (Buss & Cooke, 2005). Figure 22 
provides an example BSC for a program executive officer (PEO). The BSC contains the 
same four categories from the higher scorecard in Figure 23. Within each category, the 
PEO identified specific measures within key areas that will lead to strategic success. Each 
measure was assigned a weight, indicating the importance of that metric toward meeting 
the overall objective. While traditional BSC does not assign weights to each measurement, 
doing so allows managers to assign an overall grade to their performance. 
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Figure 22. Sample PEO Metrics. Source: Buss & Cooke (2005). 
Buss and Cooke also developed sample metrics for the deputy assistant secretary 
of the Navy (DASN) for acquisitions and procurement shown in Figure 23. The DASN 
performance matrix exists at a higher level than those in the PEO performance matrix. The 
four categories are the same among all matrices throughout the organization, while the key 
areas may change depending on the level within the DoN (Buss & Cooke, 2005). Measures 
of key area performance typically vary from level to level since the higher up the pyramid 
the matrix is, the more span of control it encompasses, necessitating metrics that more 
accurately reflect the influence a leader asserts (Buss & Cooke, 2005). 
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Figure 23. Sample DASN Metrics. Source: Buss & Cooke (2005). 
Implementing BSC performance matrices, such as the two examples shown, 
throughout an organization helps ensure each division operates in a manner consistent with 
the core strategy and vision of its high-level leadership. It requires a commitment from 
leaders and managers on every level to develop SMART metrics within key areas that 
promote the achievement of the vision. While the process is relatively simple to explain in 
comparison to other methodologies in this study, applying the techniques in an effective 
manner that resonates with workers, managers, and leaders throughout the DoN is a 
thought-provoking task that must be continually evaluated for its success. 
C. CRYPTOLOGIC CARRY-ON PROGRAM: KVA AND IRM 
While not designed to be coupled together, the KVA and IRM methodologies work 
well in concert with each other. Most processes within the DoD do not have a readily 
identifiable, quantitative metric that can be used to demonstrate the value of the process 
output. KVA can develop that common-units metric for both the process as a whole and 
the individual sub-processes that comprise it. After developing these numbers, IRM can 
use simulation to determine statistical probabilities for various outcomes, frame real 
options for the acquisition program, and quantify these options using their present value. 
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The Cryptologic Carry-On Program (CCOP) is one example of these techniques used to 
assist decision-makers in determining the best solution for decisions in an acquisition 
program.  
The CCOP is an IS-based Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
system for surface, subsurface, and airborne platforms in the U.S. Navy (Rios, 2005). There 
are numerous types of CCOP systems with different scope and functions (Rios, 2005). 
CCOP allows commercial off the shelf (COTS) and government off the shelf (GOTS) 
systems to augment systems currently on ships (Rios, 2005). COTS and GOTS systems 
usually require integration and modification for compatibility with the on-board ISR 
technology (Rios, 2005). The CCOP capability provides a more rapid transition of these 
tools (Rios, 2005). Approximately 100 surface ships were CCOP capable in 2005, 
representing a sizable portion of the Navy’s fleet (Rios, 2005). This case example focuses 
on the surface CCOP platforms. 
During fiscal year 2005, the CCOP office was given a mandate to focus on three 
specific goals: efficiencies, metrics, and return on investment (Rios, Housel, & Mun, 
2015). The CCOP PM was responsible for twelve CCOP systems and he needed to 
determine how to allocate resources amongst them (Rios et al., 2015). Following the 
guidance he received, he conducted an analysis on the programs based on the three goals 
for the program (Rios et al., 2015). As previously mentioned, the lack of revenue in the 
DoD makes return on investment difficult to calculate, so the PM turned to KVA to create 
a common-units approach when comparing the various systems (Rios, 2005). 
This case vignette provides an example of how KVA can be applied to estimate the 
value added of systems that are, on the surface, amenable to the standard KVA learning 
time approach. KVA was similarly used in estimating the value added of advanced concept 
build improvements to the Aegis ship defense system (Mun, Housel, & Wessman, 2010).  
The USS Readiness (the fictional name given to the real ship used for this analysis 
case), was equipped with four CCOP systems: A, B, C, and D (Rios et al., 2015). Each of 
these systems had different functions and scopes, although they all perform tasks within 
the Intelligence Collection Process (ICP) (Rios, 2005). Figure 24 shows the 10 sub-
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processes within the overall process of intelligence collection. Every sub-process can be 
further broken down into individual actions required to complete the sub-process with 
various degrees of automation depending on the task (Rios, Housel, & Mun, 2006). Figure 
25 illustrates the four CCOP systems and the ICP sub-processes associated with them.  
 
Figure 24. Intelligence Collection Process. Source: Rios et al. (2006). 
 
Figure 25. USS Readiness CCOP Systems. Source: Rios et al. (2006). 
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In his 2005 thesis, Cesar Rios discussed the data that was collected from a single 
ship’s six-month deployment and adjusted to reflect annual cost. Rios explained how the 
PM used the learning time method and calculated the time to learn each sub-process for 
both automated and manned tasks. Learning time for automated tasks is the time an average 
user would take to learn how to produce the same output (Rios, 2005). He then multiplied 
the learning time and the number of times each process was executed to determine the 
output of each process in common units, referred to as K. Using market comparable prices 
for similar products, he assigned a notional price to assign revenue for the CCOP systems 
contributions to each sub-process. The author explained how costs were then assigned 
based on the human and IT assets that complete each task. The PM then determined the 
ROK and the Return on Knowledge Investment (ROKI), which is a surrogate for ROI 
(Rios, 2005). Figure 26 depicts the results for each sub-process and CCOP as well as for 
the aggregate. 
 
Figure 26. Return on Knowledge Investment. Source: Rios et al. (2006). 
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Through his analysis, the PM learned that P4, the search/collection process, had the 
highest ROKI-ROI. Conversely, P8, the format data for report generation had the lowest 
ROKI. Using this data, the PM could use his breadth of knowledge to explore other 
questions that would help him make his funding determination. For instance, P4 was 
executed many more than twice as often as P8, leading to a higher total K and ultimately a 
higher return (Rios, 2005). Is P8 worth the investment in technology? Should it be more 
automated or less automated? Only one CCOP system, CCOP A, executes P8 (Rios, 2005). 
Would substituting a different system or changing a capability in a CCOP to include P8 
improve the performance? When looking at the specific CCOP systems, CCOP D is the 
only system with a negative ROKI. It is a cost-heavy system that executes tasks a small 
number of times in comparison to the other systems (Rios, 2005). Is there a cheaper 
alternative to CCOP D? Are the operators trained properly? Should CCOP D even be on 
this platform or mission? The KVA analysis itself does not give the answers to these 
questions, although it does highlight their performance in an objective manner. The PM 
should have better and more thorough information about the different CCOP variants that 
will help him make the correct decision. 
The KVA analysis also allows the PM use IRM techniques to conduct a statistical 
examination of the program since the ROKI, along with other metrics, gives the static 
financial model. In this instance, three real options were identified: 
• Strategy A, Remote to Shore: Use the CCOP systems aboard deployed 
vessels and send the data to a remote location that will review the reports 
(Rios et al., 2015). This should reduce the number of intelligence 
personnel on each ship, consolidating them in a single location ashore 
(Rios et al., 2015). 
• Strategy B, Direct Support: When a ship returns to port, the equipment and 
operators would move to another ship that is scheduled to deploy (Rios et 
al., 2015).  
• Strategy B would also reduce the number of total CCOP systems and the 
number of intelligence personnel required fleet wide (Rios et al., 2015).  
65 
• Strategy C, Permanent Ships Signals Exploitation Space (SSES): CCOP 
systems and operators will be permanently assigned to a ship, regardless 
of its deployment status (Rios et al., 2015). While the total number of 
systems and personnel will be greater than those in Strategies A and B, 
commanders will have greater flexibility and control of each ship’s 
intelligence collection capabilities (Rios et al., 2015). 
A graphical depiction of these three options is shown in Figure 27, illustrating the 
various decision trees available to the PM. Each strategy also included the option to 
abandon a project after each phase, giving the PM the ability to reevaluate the progress of 
the program before committing additional resources to the next phase. 
 
Figure 27. CCOPs Real Options Paths. Source: Rios et al. (2006). 
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The analysis produced present values for each of the different strategies, shown in 
Table 2. Commanders intuitively favored Strategy C because of the control it provided 
them over the makeup and operational capabilities of the units in their command (Rios et 
al., 2015). Strategies A and B both seemed likely to produce a greater present value due to 
perceived cost savings associated with reducing the number of systems and operators (Rios 
et al., 2015). However, the present value analysis indicates Strategy C is clearly the best 
option given the working conditions. As bandwidth limitations, processing power, and 
transmission speed improve, these options may change, necessitating a new look at the 
program, but in the current environment, the PM should choose Strategy C (Rios et al., 
2015). 
Table 2. Present Values of CCOPs Real Options Analysis. Source: 
Rios et al. (2005). 
 
 
The USS Readiness case example illustrates the potential use of the KVA and IRM 
methodologies within the Defense Acquisition System. A KVA review of the outputs of 
each system and its sub-processes produced a quantifiable, common-units metric the PM 
could use. The data could help determine which CCOP to funnel money towards, should it 
be decided to improve poor systems performance (or eliminate it altogether), make a good 
system even better, or elevate the performance of those systems performing at an average 
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level. This information can also be used when determining a replacement for the CCOP 
program with a future system. The KVA metrics give a baseline ROKI detailing the output 
a future system should meet or exceed to be considered a viable alternative.  
The IRM methodology helped frame the way forward by presenting real options 
for the PM to examine. Expounding the results via Monte Carlo simulation and developing 
a present value for the various strategies gave decision-makers a quantifiable and justifiable 
number on which to base their decision. This result could only be produced using the value 
of the output (rather than relying only on cost savings) through the KVA analysis 
conducted in earlier steps. Combining the KVA process to give a monetary value of a 
process’s output gives IRM the ability to justify its results in a more universally understood 
metric: dollars. These traits suggest the methodologies should be considered for inclusion 
within the Defense Acquisition System.  
D. SOFTWARE BUG FIX: LSS 
LSS is a methodology designed to improve processes through incremental change. 
Following the steps in the DMAIC process allows project managers to determine where 
improvements can be made, how to measure them, and what changes to make to achieve 
better results. Numerous organizations within the DoD have had success using LSS to 
better their programs. The Letterkenny Army Depot reduced cost by $26.1 million per year 
for the PATRIOT missile program and increased their revenue from $123.3 million in 2002 
to $456 million in 2006 (Harvey & Labedz, 2006). Like the examples just mentioned, LSS 
is often associated with manufacturing. However, the methodology can be employed with 
any process. The following vignette illustrates how LSS could be used in an IT setting. 
The PM for a generic IT software program realized it was taking too long to remedy 
bugs within the program (Torres & Tighe, n.d.). He set a goal of reducing the average ticket 
time to fifteen days per request, which would improve the use of resources and reduce 
costs, ultimately increasing profit for the company (Torres & Tighe, n.d.). To accomplish 
this objective, he turned to the LSS methodology in order to reduce waste and variation 
within the process. 
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During the define phase, the PM formally stated his goal of reducing the mean 
service request time by ten days in the project charter (Torres & Tighe, n.d.). He also 
established the scope of the project to prevent any additional tasks from being added to the 
LSS improvement (Torres & Tighe, n.d.). This allows for incremental change and proper 
measurement of the changes the team implements to determine their effectiveness. He 
determined who the stakeholders were and what steps and inputs they held within the 
process. Then, he mapped out the As-Is system process, shown in Figure 28, to ensure 
every step was accounted for and to aid in analysis later in the LSS process (Torres & 
Tighe, n.d.). 
 
Figure 28. As-Is Software Fix Delivery. Source: Torres & Tighe (n.d.). 
After defining the current software fix process, the PM needed to measure the 
performance of the intermediate steps to establish a baseline (Torres & Tighe, n.d.). Prior 
to collecting the data, his team developed a plan to collect the data, shown in Figure 29 
(Torres & Tighe, n.d.). This plan ensures the data in collected in a systematic, repeatable 
manner. It assigns a title, unit of measure, definition of the measurement, stratification 
factors, notes on sampling, and a responsible individual for each measurement. While  
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reviewing the data, he discovered requests to update the code ranged from three days to 55 
days before they were completed, with an average lead time of 25.8 days (Torres & Tighe, 
n.d.).  
 
Figure 29. Data Collection Plan. Source: Torres & Tighe (n.d.). 
To reach the stated goal, the PM must analyze the collected data and discover why 
the process took so long before implementing changes that could reduce the time by an 
average of ten days. He began the analysis with a fishbone diagram to determine the root 
causes of the delays. The fishbone diagram looked at people, policies, the process itself, 
and the environment in which the process operated (Torres & Tighe, n.d.). From this 
assessment, he determined the areas that should most likely require further examination 
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were the code inspections, delivering the fixes to the parent branches, and the bug fix ticket 
assignments (Torres & Tighe, n.d.). Reviewing the current process mapped out in 
Figure 28 showed possible sub-processes and stakeholders that may have extraneous steps 
or do not add the LSS definition of value (Torres & Tighe, n.d.). Figure 30 shows the total 
value added and non-value added time in days associated with each step in the overall 
process, which confirms the previous assessment of potential areas of improvement. Since 
the code inspection and delivery to parent branch steps add no value to the overall process, 
it is possible these steps may be eliminated entirely (Torres & Tighe, n.d.). Addressing the 
time required to “assign the ticket to the software developer” may also be an area of 
improvement, as it also does not add value to the final product (Torres & Tighe, n.d.). 
These hypotheses were evaluated and found to be partially true—code inspection was not 
needed for minor fixes, only for change that resulted in more than 250 lines of code (Torres 
& Tighe, n.d.). 
 
Figure 30. Value Added Flow Analysis. Source: Torres & Tighe (n.d.). 
The PM determined three root causes for the delays and now must improve the 
process based on the results from the analyze phase. He proposed four potential solutions 
to fix the root causes- remove code inspections when the total lines of code per fix are less 
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than 250, cross train the software builders to perform other jobs, cross train the software 
developers to perform other jobs, and use the Kanban methodology (a scheduling system 
associated with lean manufacturing) when assigning tickets (Torres & Tighe, n.d.). These 
proposed solutions were graded on five weighted criteria- the potential to meet the goal, 
positive customer impact, cost to implement, stakeholder buy-in, and time to implement 
(Torres & Tighe, n.d.). While cross training the software builders was not determined to 
be an effective strategy, the PM decided to implement the other three solutions (Torres & 
Tighe, n.d.). He created a map of the To-Be process, shown in Figure 31. The unnecessary 
tasks were removed from the process and the changes to the process were utilized to reduce 
bottlenecks (Torres & Tighe, n.d.). Once the changes were initiated, the team measured the 
process again using the same measurement plan. The variability between tickets was cut in 
half while the mean lead time was reduced from 25.8 days to 15.6 (Torres & Tighe, n.d.). 
 
Figure 31. To-Be Software Fix Delivery. Source: Torres & Tighe (n.d.). 
With the new process in place, the PM shifted to the control phase, documenting the 
lessons learned, impact on customers, and calculating the monetized results from the process 
improvement (Torres & Tighe, n.d.). He initiated a process control plan that allows the 
responsible individuals to track and measure the performance of the process now that the 
project has ended and normal operations have resumed (Torres & Tighe, n.d.). In a manner 
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similar to the Data Collection Plan, Figure 32 lists the measures, method the data is collected, 
frequency of review, and responsible person for overseeing each process, as well as the trigger 
points and reaction plan should the process breach a trigger point (Torres & Tighe, n.d.).  
 
Figure 32. Monitoring and Response Plan. Source: Torres & Tighe (n.d.). 
As this case shows, LSS can be used in any type of repeatable procedure from 
traditional manufacturing applications to IT software fixes. The steps in the DMAIC 
process can offer substantial results when utilized correctly. Improving established 
processes can improve the speed of the process, improve its efficiency, reduce overall cost, 
or a combination of the three. However, there are limitations with LSS, which will be 
discussed in the following chapter. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter examined various cases—both historical and hypothetical—in which the 
five methodologies may be applied. Each vignette shows the different systems in 
circumstances that favor the use of the highlighted methodology. The following chapter will 
discuss some of the benefits and challenges that must be considered when choosing a system 
to employ. 
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IV. BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES 
Parts of this chapter were previously published by the Naval Postgraduate School 
Acquisition Research Program (Housel, Mun, Jones, & Carlton, 2019). 
 
The previous chapter examined the five methodologies in different real world or 
hypothetical cases, which illustrate strengths and weaknesses associated with each system. 
This chapter reviews the benefits and challenges with employing the various 
methodologies, using the vignettes discussed in Chapter III as context.  
A. EVM 
1. Benefits 
EVM offers numerous advantages to PMs using the methodology to track the 
progress of a project. When properly implemented, it gives managers an early warning of 
potential issues within a program and a forecast of the total cost and schedule requirements 
(Fleming & Koppelman, 2010). Research has shown the CPI stabilizes within a ten percent 
range after a project reaches the twenty percent completion point (Christensen, 1998). The 
20 percent stabilization holds true across various contract types, programs and services 
(Fleming & Koppelman, 2010). This early indication gives project managers a reliable 
prediction of the projects final costs (Fleming & Koppelman, 2010). The low range of the 
cost overrun is the current cost plus the remaining scheduled cost (Fleming & Koppelman, 
2010). The high end of the costs is the budgeted cost divided by the CPI, which is a more 
accurate estimate unless extenuating circumstances caused the overrun (Fleming & 
Koppelman, 2010). SPI also gives an indication of future cost increases. An unfavorable 
SPI indicates spending will grow larger than initially planned to reduce the schedule 
variance (Christensen, 1998).  
Each component has a cost and schedule associated with its completion which feed 
into the overall completion of the project. Since the baselines are established prior to work 
beginning on any subcomponents, management can create a detailed timeline with the 
expected cost necessary to achieve the tasks well in advance. Having such a thorough plan 
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allows the PM to focus on the areas that are reporting discrepancies in their CPI and SPI 
rather than concentrating on all areas of the project. They can interact when there are issues 
with a component, trusting the aspects of a project that are on schedule and on budget to 
remain performing well. Instead of actively controlling all parts of the project, they can 
spend their limited time correcting issues with portions that have unfavorable SV and CV. 
The key metrics allow PMs to manage by exception. 
Using a WBS to assign, track, and complete tasks facilitates the accurate and timely 
reporting of a project’s performance. The use of a common system facilitates 
communication between the PM and the contractor. Since the individual components of a 
project are broken down into small subsections that must be completed, management can 
more easily communicate with contractors concerning discrepancies with subcomponents. 
This allows a PM to assign resources and facilitates subsequent tracking of a system’s 
progress without creating additional reporting requirements. Given that reporting on the 
status of a program through EVM is required by law, managing with the same system 
reduces administrative requirements (Christensen, 1998). Managing from one 
methodology while reporting from a different system is a more difficult and costly way to 
conduct business (Christensen, 1998). EVM gives managers a single system to track cost, 
completion, and project performance, centralizing the control system while allowing lower 
level managers to oversee their sections with the same metrics. 
Simplicity is a key attribute of the EVM methodology. The process is broken down 
into three main variables- money, time, and work completed. The key metrics managers 
use to assess a project are simple ratios derived from these three variables. Determining the 
performance of the project is as easy as determining how much money has been spent to 
complete the current amount of work at a given time. The methodology readily scales from 
the overall project to individual components without changing reporting requirements; 
managers simply compile the components reports into an aggregate report. However, in IS 
programs it can be more difficult to determine if the work is completed satisfactorily and 
in accordance with the stated requirements, as seen in the JTRS acquisition. 
One of the most important attributes of EVM is the combination of schedule and 
fiscal performance. Traditional cost management approaches reflect a project’s funding 
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performance and not the true cost of the program (Fleming & Koppelman, 2010). Flexible 
budgets also give management the option to vary the budget for work based on the actual 
output level (Christensen, 1998). EVM differs from a flexible budget by including the time 
dimension in its calculations. EVM puts the schedule variance into a dollar amount, 
quantifying delays. The amount of money spent completing a project is important, but it 
does not show the complete picture. If an initiative is on or under budget yet is delivered 
seven years later than promised, it did not perform well despite the potential cost savings. 
Monetizing the scheduled time gives the PM the ability to determine how much a delay 
will cost, providing greater flexibility within management decisions. 
2. Challenges 
EVM has proven to be an effective management system in traditional 
manufacturing processes. However, in fiscal year 2008, the U.S. federal IT portfolio 
contained 346 major IT programs worth approximately $27 billion that received a rating 
of “unacceptable” or are on the “Management Watch List” (Kwak & Anbari, 2012). This 
suggests there is significant room for improvement within the current IS acquisition 
process. ISs are not developed in the same manner as projects that do not process 
information. When building a warehouse, a contractor uses the architect’s blueprints to 
determine exactly how many bolts will be needed for each beam and how long it will take 
to install each item. Combining each sub-process, which consist of known values, the 
manager can establish a baseline with a high degree of accuracy. However, when a program 
involves writing code, the process is more complicated. Keeping with EVM principles, the 
desired outputs for a program are known before work begins and the plan to accomplish 
those steps can be created and mapped out prior to construction of the code. However, the 
time required to write, test, debug, and retest the computer code can vary significantly 
between projects and individuals. Using a system that measures the overall progress of a 
program using the completion of subcomponents compared to a baseline established well 
before work began is not an accurate assessment for projects that do not progress linearly, 
such as IS programs.  
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The requirements in large IS projects are often not well defined, leading to cost and 
schedule overruns. For instance, JTRS used LOCs to create the baseline. However, LOC 
can vary drastically from one programmer to another or between programming languages. 
While there are industry standards for estimating the number of LOCs, there is still variance 
between each individual creating a software program. In a traditional manufacturing 
application of EVM, a WBS containing the task ‘turn on the light’ would have schematics 
and plans associated with the task so that any qualified worker could complete the work. 
In an IS program, turning on the light via a software program could be completed in any 
number of ways and still meet the specifications. This simplistic example illustrates issues 
that will develop when using EVM to manage a more complicated IT based project, such 
as creating a software-defined waveform. 
One of the core principles of EVM is maintaining the baseline of a program 
throughout the life of the project, allowing for consistent and accurate measurement of a 
project’s progress. Adding additional requirements or changing the specifications of 
certain components can alter the trajectory of a program entirely. While any program will 
need to make adjustments when scope creep occurs, EVM is particularly ill-suited to make 
these modifications midstream. If new requirements are added to a program or existing 
requirements change after the baseline is established, especially after work commences, 
the baseline is no longer valid. More often than not, there will be additional costs and longer 
timelines required to fulfill the new specifications. This will change the ACWP while 
leaving the BCWS the same. As the actual costs increase and schedule expands compared 
to the baseline, all four performance metrics (CV, CPI, SV, and SPI) are negatively 
impacted, even if the newly added requirements are completed on time and on budget. 
EVM does not function well in projects with changing scope or requirements.  
When developing JTRS, much of the software had never been written or created, 
calling on developers to estimate how the cost and schedule for the various components. 
To account for the possibility it may not be completed in time, the engineer or PM may 
add one week to something originally thought to take three weeks, accounting for some 
risk of the unknown. Should overruns occur in other areas, PMs often remove this risk 
factor from their calculations to improve their performance compared to the baseline. This 
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eliminates much of the risk mitigation the program originally established, eventually 
leading to further CV and SV. However, when creating a complex product based on the 
assumption of future technological advancements, as in JTRS, there is a high degree of 
risk. Presuming all tasks will be completed on schedule without additional schedule risk 
mitigation is a poor assumption to make after previous components of the project have 
already fallen behind.  
EVM functions well as a tool to monitor programs developed in waterfall or parallel 
design methods. In alternative design methodologies, such as agile or iterative designs, 
EVM does not provide the same level of usefulness to project managers. EVM does not 
require a particular development approach and can be used in any system that uses a 
baseline plan relating schedule and cost (DoD, 2018). Techniques such as agile EVM and 
scrum, attempt to use a more iterative approach typical of the software development 
process but are still using the same EVM concepts with tasks broken into various work 
packages. By assigning a budget and timeline to specific features within an IS initiative, 
PMs may use EVM to oversee progress. As each feature is completed, value is earned and 
the EVM metrics are updated. However, within the specific features and components of a 
program EVM is not as useful. As previously mentioned, the specifics of writing computer 
code are not as cut and dry as a physical project. If two capabilities written in parallel both 
work individually, it is still possible there are issues when combining the features in the 
final project. To reduce this risk, PMs must add additional time in their schedule. This can 
be done by scheduling multiple increments that are planned, designed, coded, tested, and 
demonstrated (DoD, 2018). While this is a viable method to use EVM in agile design, it is 
not as accurate or precise as an EVM program in a brick and mortar type project. 
As discussed previously, the metrics within EVM are simple to understand and use 
to make management decisions. However, for the metrics to be accurate the cost and 
schedule must be accurate to a great level of detail. WBSs for multi-billion dollar programs 
often cover all items from the strategic overview down to small tasks within the project. 
Creating such a detailed list of requirements for each component within a system is both 
timely and costly. While the result may be a simple schedule with easily discernible 




The primary purpose of BSC is to align the efforts of every level of an organization 
to work towards the same strategic goals. In the example framework presented in Chapter 
III, the vision and goals are translated into key areas among the four categories that stem 
from the vision and strategy. The key areas remain the same through most levels within the 
DoN, keeping all the various units within the acquisition community aligned with the 
common strategy. The metrics and measures within each key area adjust based on a 
department’s span of control but the approach ensures the end state of every level is 
achieving the strategic vision. It is an excellent tool to ensure stakeholders at all levels 
review aspects of the acquisition structure other than the financial component. Learning 
and Growth, Internal Business Processes, Weapons Systems (finances), and the Warfighter 
are all important components of how the acquisition community operates and BSC ensures 
these categories are included in the decision making process. 
The BSC methodology also provides additional structure throughout the 
organization. Stakeholders are able to view the performance of a department at any level 
through the chosen BSC lenses. For example, the ASN(RD&A) could look at a subordinate 
acquisition command or an individual acquisition program and view the same basic 
information. While the numbers and metrics will be different between the two, the basic 
concepts are related, allowing the stakeholders to make rough comparisons between the 
various divisions’ reports.  
This structure can also improve communication up and down the organizational 
hierarchy. Since the key areas remain relatively constant and the four categories are strictly 
maintained in every level, stakeholders can easily discuss the performance of various units 
with respective to other internal agencies. Even if the metrics for an individual Marine 
Corps acquisition program and the command level of U.S. Navy Systems Command are 
vastly different, stakeholders can view the outcomes of the various categories and 
determine if the Weapon Systems or Internal Business Processes categories are performing 
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as they should and determine where additional resources- be that manpower, money, or 
equipment- should be allocated. 
Even though the BSC methodology makes measuring performance a common, 
systematic process across the organization, individual leaders are still able to determine 
their own metrics and performance criteria. The leaders at each unit should know their 
organization best and, as such, can set the measures that will best represent the overall 
execution of their tasks, provided they align with the strategic vision. Given a set of 
categories and key areas to focus mid-level management’s mindset, they are then able to 
convert these into actionable items for the people within their span of control to push 
towards accomplishing the organization’s overarching goals.  
Using BSC within an organization ensures the strategy is kept at the forefront of all 
actions. Every performance review is conducted within the framework of the company’s 
grand strategy. Monthly or quarterly reviews can determine how the unit is accomplishing 
the strategic goals. Yearly strategy reviews could ensure the strategy is relevant to the 
current operating conditions and updates are inserted into the measurement system. Should 
drastic changes occur in the internal or external environment, leadership can change the 
key areas to align with changes to the vision, helping lower levels adjust their techniques 
as needed to avoid the ‘this is how we have always done it’ mentality.  
2. Challenges 
Even though BSC can offer benefits to the acquisition community, it also presents 
unique challenges that must be overcome for its success. Despite its name, Balanced 
Scorecard is not a balanced system. The four categories are measured separately with 
different key areas and metrics within each category. If a program is performing well above 
expectations in two areas, at the expected level in one category, but well below average in 
the other last aspect, how should the PM categorize its performance? BSC does not provide 
a proverbial dial in the middle of the four categories to tie them together into a 
comprehensive measurement. While there may always be balancing issues between various 
performance metrics, such as cost, schedule, and quality, these outputs typically have 
common-units of measurement to determine their interaction. The lack of a model to tie 
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the categories together makes it difficult to determine if corrective action should be taken 
in the above example or which area should receive more attention in the event of two 
categories underperforming. The framework discussed in Chapter III addresses this issue 
by assigning weights to each category, which assigns the importance of each metric but 
also raises the next challenge within BSC. 
Comparing different types of measurements that do not have common units is not 
done easily, especially when they use different types of data. There are four levels of 
measurement, listed here with increasing level of precision: nominal, ordinal, interval, and 
ratio (Statistic Solutions, n.d.). Nominal data is name only, such as the red, yellow, or green 
often seen on scorecard sheets (Statistic Solutions, n.d.). Ordinal data depicts the order 
relationship within a set, such as small, medium, or large (Statistic Solutions, n.d.). Interval 
measurements have the same distance between each unit, such as measuring temperature 
in Fahrenheit, where the change in heat associated with one degree is the same no matter 
if it is hot or cold (Statistic Solutions, n.d.). Finally, ratio data has equal intervals but can 
also include zero within the scale, such as financial data (Statistic Solutions, n.d.). Interval 
and ratio data are much more precise than nominal and ordinal data and are used to measure 
different things. Moving data from a higher level to lower level is acceptable (i.e., calling 
a 20 oz. cup a large), but moving from lower level to higher is not (i.e., assuming a large 
contains 20 oz.). However, within BSC practitioners often move back and forth between 
the various scales, convoluting the data and compromising the integrity of the 
measurements. While the examples in Chapter III have well defined metrics that do not 
violate the principles discussed, it can be problematic if leaders at different levels use 
metrics with inappropriate scales, especially if that information is then aggregated and used 
at higher levels.  
The underlying concepts of BSC are not overly complex and they average user can 
likely grasp them within a short amount of time. However, implementing BSC into an 
organization, especially an organization as large as the acquisition community, can be a 
massive feat. Using BSC as it is designed requires a complete overhaul to the organization. 
Categories, key areas, and metrics must be determined and assigned at each individual level 
within the community. The metrics must be validated to ensure measurement errors are 
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avoided and the complete picture is captured through the chosen measures. Due to the 
hierarchical structure, lower level managers cannot create their metrics without knowing 
the specific measures required by the level above their unit. It would be difficult for PMs 
to develop metrics to meet strategic goals without appropriate context.  
Since the premise behind the methodology is “what you measure is what you get” 
(Kaplan & Norton, 1992, p. 71), performance evaluations for programs and individuals 
must be tailored to include the new BSC metrics. To prevent issues with data accuracy, 
formatting, version control, and other complexities, the measurement reporting system 
must be tailored for each unit and program using BSC. As each metric within key areas 
may be specific to an individual program, this must be created for the organization, 
reducing flexibility. The vision and strategy may change with time, indicating BSC projects 
do not have a defined end date. As leadership changes, goals may change, necessitating 
updated key areas and metrics. 
C. KVA 
1. Benefits 
KVA is an objective, quantifiable method to measure the value associated with a 
system and the sub-processes within the system. The value measurements of each process 
are ratio scale numbers, allowing analysts to compare them with the values from other sub-
processes to determine their relative effectiveness. PMs can determine the value generated 
from the human component against the value added by IT processes. Because of the scales, 
PMs can use these measurements to develop useful ratios in their analysis of the program’s 
performance. Productivity ratios such as ROK, output of a process divided by the process 
cost, and ROI, output minus cost divided by cost. The ROKs and ROIs, which are always 
100% correlated, give managers information about the amount of value a process generates 
compared to the amount of money spent to create the value. Unlike any other methodology, 
KVA assigns these figures to both the process and sub-processes rather than only the 
process as a whole. The CCOP case shows that an increase in the amount of automation 
within a process does not necessitate an increase in value, which is often assumed when 
acquiring ISs. 
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Conducting an analysis of a program using KVA will give a PM a clearer picture 
of the operational components of the program. While organizations likely have metrics 
used to determine the performance of a project or operation, ROK will give them additional 
information to improve their management decisions. PMs can determine the relative value 
of the components that comprise the program. Knowing a particular job or sub-process 
gives the same output value as a different process but at a different cost may provide 
context for the performance of the system. This, in turn, gives experienced managers the 
information needed to allocate resources to specific components of a program that need 
improvement or should be utilized more frequently. As seen in the CCOP example, the PM 
learned which CCOPs and processes had a high or low ROK. He could then use his 
expertise to determine the most beneficial use of his limited resources. 
While a KVA analysis can provide information that will change the course of a 
program or project, it does not require significant changes to organizational structure or 
reporting processes to do so. The evaluation can be conducted during normal operating 
conditions without introducing complicated new metrics into the system. Learning time, 
process description, or the binary query method are all based on information that should be 
available within the organization. A small amount of ‘hands on’ measurement may be 
required to verify the accuracy of the given data. As such, the analysis can be done quicker 
than the other methodologies, giving PMs access to actionable information more rapidly 
than previous methods. 
2. Challenges 
KVA will give analysts a quantifiable, ratio-scale number for the value of the sub-
processes. However, it does this only with processes that consist of known a priori outputs. 
The intangible items, such as creativity and imagination, that occur within the human brain 
cannot be quantified with this method (or any other method so far). In fact, no current 
system is able to accurately quantify these creative types of intangibles within a process 
because there is no algorithm for creativity. These factors are not common to the average 
user and as such, cannot be defined via any of the KVA methods- learning time, binary 
query, or process description- because the creativity process cannot be learned or 
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described. The CCOP case shows how one can use KVA to measure complicated tasks that 
humans cannot perform by quantifying the knowledge embedded within the signal 
intelligence systems. However, this was only possible after the system was completed and 
described. KVA will assign the value of process but it cannot predict the value of potential 
outputs, only those that are specified a priori. 
While KVA provides the PM with an objective measurement of the ROK, the ROK 
itself does not provide recommendations for future actions. Knowing CCOP A has a good 
ROKI and CCOP D has a much lower ROKI does not tell the PM what to do with his 
resources. He must decide if the limited resources in his program should be allocated to 
CCOP A to leverage its excellent performance or if they would be best used improving 
CCOP D to increase the ROKI for future iterations. The analysis provides leaders with 
useful data when comparing the sub-processes and programs within their control, but it 
does not give definitive answers on what to do with those processes. Instead, leaders must 
utilize their knowledge and expertise of the program to decide the best course of action. 
This is why the CCOP example used IRM to compare possible solutions once the ROKIs 
were established. 
Although KVA will provide ratio-scale numbers to aid in evaluating processes 
within a program, the ratios are often only valid for comparisons within the same analysis. 
Benchmarking the raw numbers with other organizations or with different divisions in the 
same organization may not provide a usable assessment depending on the techniques used 
when determining the ROK. For instance, the CCOP method used learning time to establish 
the ROK for the different systems. However, another analyst may have used the binary 
query or process description methods to describe the outputs in an equally defensible 
evaluation. These numbers will not be comparable to the numbers from the learning time 
method unless they are normalized, even though the final analysis will result in the same 
relative quantitative comparisons of productivity. Other variances may cause the same 
issues, such as if an analyst includes the underlying infrastructure or common training for 
all personnel. Because these can be treated as constants across all processes, they can be 
excluded without skewing the final results. Nevertheless, the final results of any properly 




The combination of several proven techniques makes IRM a valuable tool to 
improve the quality of information available when making decisions. Introducing dynamic 
Monte Carlo simulation to analysis of potential initiatives and investments illustrates the 
risks associated with the projects in a more realistic manner than traditional approaches. 
Static forecasting based on assumptions and historical performance offers a limited view 
of the range of a project’s possible outcomes. Running thousands of simulations (or more) 
while adjusting the variables within realistic possibilities allows decision makers to obtain 
a more complete picture of the uncertainty inherent within the project. Increasing the 
amount of relevant and accurate information managers can access will improve the quality 
of decisions made by the leadership team.  
IRM provides a systematic approach to addressing IT investments. Following the 
eight steps is a straightforward process that facilitates a quantitative decision making 
process. While the functions within each step are sometimes complicated and require 
additional training to complete, the process as a whole is clear-cut and easy to follow. Since 
the IRM method is well defined, it can be implemented into established procedures without 
a complete reengineering of established processes. Data used in traditional methods will 
be used in IRM and expanded to improve the scope of a project’s evaluation. The present 
value analysis on the three CCOP real options paths used data that was already available 
to the PM. The real options were quantified and resulted in an output that differed from 
expectations. The systemic nature of IRM allows the process to be completed by different 
members or different teams without recollecting data and starting from the beginning. After 
analysts have completed training in IRM, they should be able to continue the process from 
any point within the method.  
Armed with the probability of certain outputs from the project, real options analysis 
allows managers to determine the best method to proceed with a project. The CCOP case 
demonstrated multiple ways real options can be included in program management. Real 
options were presented not only at the beginning of the program with three different 
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directions for the program to head, but also after each different phases of the chosen 
strategy. By writing a contract that lets an organization adjust their chosen course of action 
as more information becomes available, the company can minimize losses for failing 
programs and capitalize on initiatives that are performing well or show promise. 
Fortunately, within DoD acquisitions, many real options are already commonplace. The 
government regularly cancels contracts due to a change in fiscal policy, failure to meet 
specifications, or other reasons. Adding other real options to contracts would not be a 
completely foreign concept. 
A key strength of the IRM methodology is the use of common units to make 
strategic decisions relate to the value of a system. By implementing KVA measurements 
into the static and dynamic IRM models, leadership can see a statistical range depicting the 
potential value of a project. In the CCOPs example, the IRM metrics stemmed directly 
from the KVA methodology. The market comparable prices generated from the value 
analysis were used to determine the present values of the real option strategies. Most other 
methods only use the cost of the program to determine its effectiveness, assuming the value 
is inherent due to the requirements that were generated. IRM can inform decision makers 
about both the costs associated with a potential investment into an initiative and the value 
of the said initiative in units that can be directly compared.  
2. Challenges 
While IRM is an extremely useful analytical tool, there are drawbacks to the 
process as well. The various techniques within the method can be difficult to master 
(Housel et al., 2019). It is a complicated process that requires a detailed understanding of 
both finance and statistics to complete a thorough analysis. While there are software tools 
to assist in conducting the analysis, the inputs are more complicated than simply inserting 
a few numbers into a program and reading an output. However, with an understanding of 
the basic concepts, sufficient training, and the correct tools, an analyst can generate the 
necessary information to allow decision makers access to the appropriate comparative 
material to make an informed decision (Housel et al., 2019). The information congregated 
during the statistical analysis can appear daunting. For those without a strong statistics 
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background, the simulations and their outputs seemingly come from a quantitative black-
box (Mun, 2016). If decision makers do not understand why an analyst makes a 
recommendation, it can be easy to disregard the suggestions and rely on familiar 
techniques. Creating comprehensive and thorough reports for management review 
combined with informed presentations to alleviate concerns with the unaccustomed 
procedures will combat this potential issue. 
To take advantage of real options, these options must be considered in advance of 
the decision to enact any of the options. Leadership must recognize the future option when 
writing contracts to ensure certain options remain available. Some options, such as the 
option to expand, can be enacted relatively simply by developing another project based on 
the success of the initial investment. However, the option to abandon may not be as readily 
available to project managers if the contract did not include appropriate clauses. Vendors 
must be willing to accept potential cancellation of sub-contracts when they are not at fault, 
which may increase the price they charge to complete a task. Due to the potential increased 
cost associated with contracting real options, managers must conduct a detailed analysis of 
which potential options may be exercised in the future. The CCOPs example shows a good 
method of ascertaining the real options prior to execution. This allowed the PM to conduct 
a sound analysis of the different options prior to signing contracts with vendors. 
Like all financial forecasting, IRM relies on historical data to make predictions. 
Predictions that incorporate current information in their analysis rather than relying purely 
on historical trends can provide more insight to decision makers. For example, 
sophisticated meteorologists create weather predictions from multiple sources. Doppler 
radar, satellites, radiosondes (i.e. weather balloons), automated surface-observing systems 
observe the current weather conditions (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA), 2017). Using numerical weather prediction, the data from the various sources is 
run in models based on known historical patterns for the region (NOAA, n.d.). For the 
meteorologist, knowing the current conditions is just as important as knowing the historical 
models (NOAA, n.d.). Similarly, if the project analyst had the ability to incorporate 
relevant information that is current to the minute (or to the required fidelity) the models 
would provide even more accurate information. The CCOPs case is an example of a project 
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comparing known historical options. Outsourcing, reducing manning, and maintaining the 
current structure all had statistics that could be used in simulations because of similar 
projects with historical data. Although this drawback is not unique to the IRM 
methodology, leaders should be aware of this flaw in any financial prediction.  
Finally, the DoD does not currently incentivize project managers reaping the 
positive benefits of risk. The risk framework within DoD acquisitions is designed to 
minimize cost and schedule overruns during a project. The structure of DoD contracts does 
not encourage increased capability or performance from vendors or the project as a whole. 
Where a for-profit business may invest in an endeavor that may fail, they do so because 
they believe the upside reward is greater than the potential cost of failure. For instance, if 
a design objective for an aircraft is to reach 250 knots and the design threshold is 200 knots, 
the budget will be for the threshold vice the objective. There will not be enough funding 
for the program to reach the objective unless the PM is able to reallocate resources 
internally. The acquisitions process looks at the cost to reach the objective rather the value 
of the objective. For-profit companies reward for performance, which is measured by 
revenue. The DoD’s unspoken surrogate for revenue is cost savings, which promotes a 
different value than increasing the value of a project. Conversely, DoD acquisitions only 
proceed once the negative consequences are mitigated to the greatest extent possible. The 
upside risk is of minimal importance to the project managers; the program simply needs to 
be completed on time and on budget. Although it is still vital to examine how potential 
projects it into the overall collection of acquisitions and current assets in the DoD, the 
contract structure limits some of the portfolio optimization aspects of IRM. 
E. LSS 
1. Benefits 
LSS allows PMs to increase the value within their program by improving the 
product quality or reducing the overall cost. It can optimize processes already in place, 
allowing for incremental improvements without the need for expensive redesigns. Using 
LSS techniques will help PMs determine the root cause of any problems to enact the 
appropriate changes rather than simply addressing symptoms of the problem, which may 
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allow them to recur. The software fix case study shows how the LSS principles helped 
create a more efficient system by identifying where the bottlenecks and waste were in the 
process. Determining the source of issues within the IS or the processes that support the IS 
will improve either the final product or the steps that lead to the creation and support of the 
IS. 
Identifying waste within the system lowers the cost, which can lead to significant 
savings when applied to the lifecycle of a program. A large portion of the total cost of a 
program can occur after the product is initially fielded, especially with programs that are 
intended to have a long service life. For example, the service life of the B-52 will likely 
last over eighty years, with 90% of the lifecycle cost incurring during the Operations and 
Support phase (Apte & Kang, 2006). While IS programs will likely not have as lengthy a 
lifecycle as the B-52, improvements to established processes can result in significant cost 
savings, especially when the refinements are discovered early in the lifecycle. The case 
study demonstrates how waste may be encountered and reduced in an IS program through 
analysis. 
LSS is already widely used within the DoD, making the implementation process 
easier due to the relative familiarity of the methodology. The Red River Army Depot 
implemented LSS in their recapitalization efforts, increasing High Mobility Multipurpose 
Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) output from 1 vehicle every 2 days to 32 vehicles a day, 
improving the Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMITT) delivery time from 
120 days per vehicle to 30 days per vehicle, and producing 16 Small Emplacement 
Excavators (SEEs) a month compared to 5 a month before the LSS initiative (Tonkin, 
2007). The Letterkenny Army Depot improved the PATRIOT missile recapitalization 
program using LSS, saving over $26.1 million a year and improving turnaround time by 
2.5 months (Harvey & Labedz, 2006). Some Marine Aviation Logistics Squadrons have 
LSS black belts that train both the intermediate and organizational level maintainers in the 
basic techniques of LSS. Since there are numerous examples of LSS use within the 
military, the lessons learned and procedures that were developed during this extensive use 
in the DoD can be translated into the acquisition process. 
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2. Challenges 
LSS works best when examining an established process to determine the waste, 
inefficiencies, and discrepancies within the system. It does not perform as well when 
developing a new process. LSS is designed to create incremental improvements in the 
system, not to create innovative solutions or new designs. In the software case study, the 
to-be system the PM created came from the careful analysis of the flaws in the as-is system 
rather than an entirely new idea or design. While PMs should keep LSS components—such 
as the elements of waste, mistake proofing, etc.—in mind when developing their processes 
since they are important principles to any procedure, LSS itself is best used to improve the 
procedure once it is in place. 
LSS can be costly to implement on a large scale. While the various certification 
agencies charge different amounts for different training levels, each belt level requires an 
employee to attend courses to complete the training, which can range from as little as one 
day for white or yellow belt courses or as long as four weeks for black belt certification. 
The employer must pay for the training and compensate employees for their time. While 
any new technique will require training, LSS emphasizes training a large portion of your 
workforce on at least the basics of the methodology. This can result in significant costs 
depending on the size of the company and number of trainees. 
The principles of LSS can lead to an overly enthusiastic approach to cost savings. 
Creating a process that conforms to six sigma of variance (1 defect in every 3.4 million 
items) is often a time consuming and costly endeavor and an organization may not 
recuperate money made improving the product if customers do not demand the higher 
quality item. Depending on the product and customers’ preferences, a cheaper method with 
a slightly higher defect rate may be preferable to a more expensive method with a lower 
defect rate. Eliminating waste is fine as long as the product remains the same and keeps 
the same value for the customer. However, it is easy for managers to view portions of a 
product that add value to a product or service as unnecessary, removing these sections 
while eliminating waste. Reducing waste within a process and variance in a product are 
important intermediate steps as long as they are accomplished with the ultimate goal of 
reducing cost for the organization and not simply a form of extreme quality control. 
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F. COMPARISON OF KEY ATTRIBUTES 
Choosing a methodology should depend on the nature of the project under 
consideration, specifically, the commitment needed from the organization, the 
organization’s desire to align strategic goals with the project, the predictive capability of 
the methodology, the flexibility required, and the time available. Table 3 compares these 
categories across the five methodologies. While others in the organization need to 
understand the concepts to comprehend status reports, EVM only needs the management 
team to track the cost and schedule of the project compared to the baseline as there is no 
goal alignment with the organization. While the CPI and SPI can help estimate the final 
cost and schedule, there is no true predictive ability associated with EVM since the 
assumption is that the schedule will proceed according to the baseline, regardless of 
previous performance. Adherence to the baseline is essential in EVM, and changing 
requirements can drastically alter a baseline, reducing the effectiveness of the 
methodology. Setting up, monitoring, and reporting the performance of each work package 
within the WBS can be a time-consuming and expensive task.  
Based on the strategic goal alignment and the department-specific metrics, the 
entire organization is committed to any BSC efforts. The underlying assumption within 
BSC is that measuring something will improve its performance. As such, leaders are 
predicting improvement in the areas being measured, although BSC does not give a 
numerical estimate of the improvement. BSC is flexible in that the same key areas can lead 
to different metrics depending on the specific department’s tasks. These tasks and metrics 
can also change as the organization shifts its vision or strategy. However, doing so can take 
a significant amount of time as every level must adjust its metrics and can do so only after 
the immediate superior has updated the metrics for that level.  
KVA needs only the analyst and the process owner as the subject matter expert to 
determine the value of a process’s output, eliminating the need to align the project with an 
organization’s goals. Using this analysis, they can establish the current as-is process and 
compare it with the to-be process in development, predicting the improvement between 
systems. Since KVA can be used with any language of description to define the process, 
analysts can choose whichever method is most beneficial for the particular system in 
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question, providing flexibility. This analysis can be completed quickly, potentially 
providing a rough-cut assessment within a few days.  
Table 3. Comparison of Key Attributes 
 
 
IRM requires the organizational leadership, portfolio and project managers, and the 
analyst to determine how a project fits within an organization’s portfolio, the PV of the 
project, and potential real options. By analyzing and simulating various scenarios, IRM 
provides a prediction of a project’s likely performance, which allows managers to build in 
flexibility via real options at the appropriate locations. Assuming the data necessary for the 
analysis is available, the process can be completed in a relatively quick manner. 
Leadership, project and process managers, a project champion, and LSS team 
members must all be involved for an LSS initiative to have success. Leadership is needed 
to provide funding for black and green belt training to ensure improvements made to 
processes remain in place and additional areas with potential enhancements are identified. 
While the overarching goals of the company will not change because of LSS, some 
business practices will be adjusted to make iterative improvements. There is limited 
predictive capability within the methodology other than that the areas from which waste 
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and variation are removed will produce a more efficient product. LSS makes numerous 
incremental changes that can be time consuming before a process is optimized. 
G. METHODOLOGIES IN IS ACQUISITION 
As previously discussed, the five methodologies all have strengths and weaknesses, 
making them more suitable in certain applications than others. Table 4 depicts some of 
these considerations when conducting an acquisition of a software-intensive system, 
hardware-intensive system, upgrade to a legacy system, or a complete, organic build. The 
biggest challenge in using EVM when acquiring ISs is the iterative nature of software 
development. EVM needs clearly stated, detailed requirements for intermediate steps to be 
most effective. While the outputs of software programs are defined well, the steps required 
to build the software are not, leading to issues when developing cost and schedule 
estimates. If the software is not complex or consists of known processes, EVM can 
sufficiently monitor the progress. Integrating software and hardware is also complicated 
with EVM since there are numerous pieces of the program that must be combined to meet 
the goals, resulting in additional debugging and recoding. EVM is more efficient when 
used to manage the physical creation of systems or infrastructure. It can monitor the 
progress of software work packages but is not as useful at estimating the earned value of 
those programs until the requirements have been delivered.  
BSC can assist mangers in aligning the goals of the organization with those of their 
individual program, whether they are dominated by hardware or software. This is 
especially true during an organic build, ensuring the entire IS under development is created 
with the strategy and vision of the acquisition community in mind. However, it can be 
difficult to change the vision when implementing updates to existing hardware and 
software systems already in use if the original strategy differs greatly from the strategy 
already in place. For example, if the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) needs future updates 
through acquisition programs and the future vision of the DoN focuses on redundancy for 
combat operations versus the current vision of IS replacing manpower, it will be difficult, 
if not impossible, to redesign the ship with the necessary modifications.  
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KVA can provide an objective, ratio scale measure of value and cost for each sub-
process within any of the IS systems. Using the two measurements, managers can then 
analyze productivity ratios, such as ROI, to determine the effectiveness of a process 
compared to the resources used to achieve the output. This can help the manager decide 
how to use resources to update systems or estimate the future value of a system being 
acquired. Combining the KVA results with IRM allows managers to iterate the value of 
real options analysis through simulation and other techniques. IRM can also quantify risks 
and assign probabilities of success for programs and components of programs using 
historical data. It is a tool to assist with the investment strategy, making it useful when 
acquiring all types of ISs. However, it is not designed to help manage the actual acquisition 
of a program or determine how to meet its detailed requirements. 
LSS is best used after a process has reached its steady-state operational capability. 
Then it can be used to analyze any of the systems to reduce waste and variation within the 
processes. The corrections made to the sustainment process are done incrementally, 
gradually improving the efficiency of the program over time. While elements of LSS, such 
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as mistake proofing, may be beneficial during the acquisition process, LSS as a whole 
works better after the program is operational and can make adjustments to improve the 
system as a whole. 
H. SUMMARY 
Examining the benefits and challenges of the five proposed methodologies 
demonstrates the scope, capabilities, and limitations of the various systems. It also helps 
inform which areas and phases of the Defense Acquisition System may be appropriate to 
include the methodologies or portions of the methodologies within the system. The next 
chapter provides recommendations based on these findings. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
Parts of this chapter were previously published by the Naval Postgraduate School 
Acquisition Research Program (Housel, Mun, Jones, & Carlton, 2019). 
 
A. RESEARCH FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The central question of this research was, “how should the methodologies be used 
in the acquisition life cycle to help ensure successful acquisition of IS technologies?” 
It should be noted that EVM is required for all programs with a contract value 
greater than $20 million. Regardless of this requirement, EVM offers a structured approach 
to the acquisition of IT via program management processes that track schedule and cost. 
While there are some significant limitations when using EVM for IS acquisitions, this was 
the only program management methodology required by the government and can be useful 
in ensuring that an acquisition stay on schedule and within cost estimates. 
The major weakness of EVM for IT acquisition is that it was not designed for 
managing IT acquisitions that follow a very iterative pathway. Organic IT acquisitions 
require a given level of flexibility to deal with the unknowns that arise during the 
development process. In addition, EVM does not provide a common unit of value metric 
to enable standard productivity metrics, such as ROI. When value is inferred by how 
consistent a program is with original baseline cost and schedule estimates, the performance 
of the program may sacrifice on the quality of the outputs when planned program activities 
become iterative, as in the development of many IT programs. For example, if an IT 
program is trending toward cost and schedule overruns, but the resulting value added of 
the modifications to the original requirements provides disproportionate increases in value, 
EVM is not designed to recognize this increase in value.  
To remedy these shortcomings of EVM in IT acquisitions, the methodology should 
be combined with VA and IRM. KVA can be useful during the requirements phase of EVM 
by ensuring that a given IT acquisition is aligned with organizational strategy and that a 
baseline process model has been developed for establishing current performance before 
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acquisition of the supporting IT. A future process model that estimates the value added of 
the incorporation of the IT can also set expectations that can be measured against the 
baseline model after the IT has been acquired. IRM can be used to value the real options 
that an acquired IT may provide so that leadership can select the option that best fits their 
desired goals for the IT inclusion. This kind of information can help guide the requirements 
analysis based on expected value added by the IT over time.  
BSC is not recommended for use within the Defense Acquisition System as a means 
to ensure an IT acquisition aligns with the overall defense strategy for any given area or 
military service. The primary purpose of BSC is to ensure all levels of the organization are 
aligned to the organizational strategy and vision. The requirements process already 
produces outputs aligned with the strategic goals. PMs must oversee their programs in 
accordance with the given requirements, which should force them to automatically align 
with the vision of the DoD. The “what you measure is what you get” theory is accounted 
for in the Defense Acquisition System. The specifications, cost, and schedule are the 
desired measurements that must be followed. While BSC might provide some benefit in 
aligning goals throughout the DoD or the entire acquisition process (i.e., using BSC to 
align requirements, budgeting, and acquisition together), using BSC exclusively within the 
Defense Acquisition System is not recommended. 
KVA should be used in the acquisition of IT. Having an objective, quantifiable 
measure of value in common units will allow decision-makers to better understand and 
compare different options based on their value and the cost. Obtaining a return on 
investment of IT systems can only be done when using KVA to determine the value 
embedded in the system. This information provides insight to PMs and gives them a more 
complete perspective regarding the performance of both the current and the to-be systems. 
Likewise, using IRM is recommended when acquiring IS through the Defense 
Acquisition System. Applying static and dynamic modeling techniques to predict likely 
outcomes can improve the risk estimates associated with the components and sub-
components of a program. Analyzing various real options within the context of the models’ 
outputs will help PMs make the most advantageous choices when determining a program’s 
future. 
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LSS should also be used when acquiring IT. The incremental advancements LSS 
principles can discover may result in significant improvements in efficiencies and cost 
saving measures over the life of a program. Using the DMAIC process to eliminate waste 
and reduce variation will enhance program performance. The techniques can be applied to 
all types of processes, including both hardware and software-based systems. Improvements 
may be made to aspects of programs ranging from the software repair process to the depot 
level repair of the hardware in an IS. The military already has extensive experience with 
LSS, including education teams and a belt training system. This familiarity will make the 
introduction of the formal LSS methodology into the Defense Acquisition System easier 
than other options. 
A secondary research question was, “how should the methodologies be used in the 
acquisition life cycle to ensure successful acquisition of IS technologies? 
PMs should use EVM only in EMD phase, as is currently done. EVM will work 
best in hardware manufacturing solutions with technology that is fully mature prior to the 
program beginning. Since many IS acquisition programs consist of advancing the current 
technology and developing new software solutions to meet requirements, EVM is not 
perfectly suited for IS development. Nevertheless, PMs can use various agile EVM 
techniques to complete projects on baseline provided the appropriate steps are taken when 
establishing the baseline. Requirements must be broken into small, easily definable tasks 
with suitable risk and uncertainty factors accounted for within the schedule. Other 
methodologies should be used with EVM to ensure these factors are based on defendable 
metrics rather than simply guessing how much additional time, money, and value may be 
necessary to complete complex tasks. 
During the MSA phase, KVA will help determine the value of the different options 
considered in the AoA. KVA can objectively measure the value of the current, as-is system 
and the potential to-be systems under consideration. Using other factors such as cost, 
complexity, timeline, etc., the PM can then select an appropriate alternative. As the chosen 
solutions mature during the TMRR phase, an updated KVA analysis will reassess initial 
estimates and provide a projected return on investment for the IT solution prior to entering 
the EMD phase. In the OS phase, KVA will help decision-makers establish how a program 
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is performing and use that information to make any adjustments or corrections that may be 
needed. KVA has limited prediction capabilities, so it should be used in conjunction with 
other methodologies, particularly IRM, to obtain the most benefit. 
IRM techniques should be implemented during most of the acquisition phases. 
Ideally, portfolio management decisions were made during the requirements development 
process, although they should also be considered during MSA. Financial and value analysis 
derived from KVA, as well as simulation of possible outcomes should occur during the 
MSA, TMRR, and EMD phases. The results of these simulations should be fed into the 
EVM baselines to account for risk across the program. Real options should be developed 
during the TMRR phase prior to awarding contracts and the real options should be executed 
during the EMD and PD phases as appropriate. 
LSS will best serve IS acquisitions after the product is implemented in the 
operational forces during the OS phase, which overlaps with PD. While individual 
manufacturers may use LSS in their manufacturing processes, PMs will not see the full 
benefits of this methodology until the program is in its steady state operation and the 
incremental improvements can have the greatest effect on process improvement and cost 
savings. LSS will help PMs evaluate the system through in depth analysis of updates, 
upgrades, repairs, and other services that occur during OS. Elements of LSS may be useful 
in other phases of the Defense Acquisition System as most processes can be improved in 
some manner. However, formal LSS procedures should not be established until the system 
is in use, regardless of whether it is a hardware or software-based system.  
The final research question asked, “what are the risks and limitations of using each 
of the methodologies for IS acquisition?” The risks and limitations of each methodology 
were reviewed in detail in Chapter IV. This analysis led to the recommendations listed 
above.  
B. FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis examined if five methodologies— EVM, BSC, KVA, IRM, and LSS— 
could be used within the Defense Acquisition System to improve the acquisition of ISs. 
Future research should examine how these methodologies may interact with or improve 
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other components of the acquisition system. This includes the JCIDS and PPBE 
components as individual processes and the interaction of JCIDS, PPBE, and the Defense 
Acquisition System as a whole. Certain methodologies, specifically BSC, may be more 
beneficial when used throughout the entire acquisition process instead of within a portion 
of the system. Additionally, future research could examine how these different methods 
may be used in the acquisition of products outside the IS or IT realm. 
The research conducted for this thesis looked at ISs as a whole and not specific 
types of ISs or IT. Future studies should examine if acquisition methods, strategies, and 
methodologies should change based on the category of IS being acquired. This is of specific 
interest when considering artificial intelligence and its subsets. Machine learning, 
intelligence with a specific focus or field of expertise, and general or universal intelligence 
would likely have different methods used in the acquisition process based on their 
complexity, complicated nature, undeveloped technology, and level of risk. 
The applicability of these methodologies within commercial acquisition of ISs is 
another area of potential research. This thesis focused exclusively on the application of the 
respective techniques within the DoD acquisition process. However, commercial entities 
also struggle when acquiring complex or complicated IS and IT systems, particularly when 
the systems operate at the enterprise level. Further research may indicate if these same 
methodologies could provide value to decision makers in the private sector during the 
creation, adoption, or customization of commercial ISs. 
Finally, this thesis examined only five methodologies out of numerous different 
possibilities. Future research could examine other program management tools, 
management philosophies, analytic tools, or other methodologies and their benefit when 
acquiring ISs. While the examined methodologies were chosen because they would likely 
benefit the process, other systems may be more appropriate in certain phases or may offer 
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